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“A MIDDLE TEMPERATURE BETWEEN THE TWO”1:
EXPLORING INTERMEDIATE REMEDIES FOR THE
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH MARYLAND’S EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION STATUTE
Marc A. DeSimone, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The law has long recognized that “[t]he vagaries of eyewitness
identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with
instances of mistaken identification.”2 It is only in the past five
decades, however, that the law has evaluated whether eyewitness
identifications may be excluded from use at a criminal trial.3
The present constitutional test is grounded in due process and
protects a criminal defendant “against the introduction of evidence of,
or tainted by, unreliable pretrial identifications obtained through
unnecessarily suggestive procedures.”4
This analysis is only
“applicable when the police have arranged suggestive circumstances
leading the witness to identify a particular person as the perpetrator
of a crime”5 and results in the exclusion of the identification unless
the prosecution can show that the identification is independently
reliable.
In the intervening four decades since this test reached maturity, the
advent of DNA analysis and resulting exonerations of innocent
individuals have shown that honest, but incorrect, identifications of
the accused are the leading cause of wrongful conviction.6
Contemporaneously, social science has endeavored to understand
*
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Assistant Public Defender, Maryland Office of the Public Defender (Appellate
Division) and Lecturer of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School
of Law.
Andrew White, An Account of the Colony of the Lord Baron of Baltimore, 1633, in
NARRATIVES OF EARLY MARYLAND 1633-1684, at 7 (Clayton Colman Hall ed.,
1910); see also Andrew White, A Briefe Relation of the Voyage unto Maryland, by
Father Andrew White, 1634, in NARRATIVES OF EARLY MARYLAND 1633-1684, at 40,
45 (Clayton Colman Hall ed., 1910); ROBERT J. BRUGGER, MARYLAND: A MIDDLE
TEMPERAMENT 1634-1980, at 3 (1988).
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
See infra Section II.A.
Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 227 (1977).
Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 232 (2012).
See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
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how eyewitness memories are formed, retained, retrieved, and
utilized to make an identification. The dual realization of the
prevalence of honest, but incorrect, identifications and the underlying
science which can produce more reliable identifications, has
motivated several states to spurn the due process approach of the
United States Supreme Court and adopt new standards for the
admissibility of eyewitness identifications, which synthesize the
present scientific understandings of eyewitness memory and
identification with the extent legal tests.
The United States Supreme Court and the Maryland Court of
Appeals have refused to join this reformational trend and have
retained the present due process based analysis. In 2014, however,
the Maryland General Assembly legislatively reformed the area of
extrajudicial eyewitness identification procedures. Specifically, as of
January 1, 2016, Maryland law enforcement agencies are required by
statute to adopt several reforms to extrajudicial eyewitness
identification procedures, which social science has shown produce
more reliable identifications.7 Thus, in Maryland, the issue is not
whether these reforms should be adopted; these procedures are
required as a matter of law and as a matter of Maryland public policy.
The issue is one of enforcement: the statute requiring these
procedures has no exclusionary provision, nor enforcement
mechanism, and the failure to adopt or utilize the statutorily required
procedures for creating and administering an extrajudicial
identification procedure will not result in the suppression of a
resulting identification.
This article addresses what remedies should be available to a
criminal defendant in Maryland who has been identified in an
extrajudicial identification procedure that does not comply with the
present statutory requirements. Part II of this article provides an
7.

The scope of this article is limited to “extrajudicial” identification procedures (viz.,
procedures in which an eyewitness is asked to identify a suspect outside of the
judicial process and outside of the view of a judge or jury (and usually outside of the
view of the defendant or counsel)). The most common of these extrajudicial
procedures are photographic arrays and in-person lineups. This reference to
“extrajudicial” procedures is essentially coextensive with the present Maryland
statutory definition of an “identification procedure.” See MD. CODE ANN., PUB.
SAFETY § 3-506.1(a)(8) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016) (defining an “identification
procedure” as a “procedure in which a live lineup is conducted or an array of
photographs, including a photograph of a suspect and additional photographs of
other persons not suspected of the offense, is displayed to an eyewitness in hard copy
form or by computer for the purpose of determining whether the eyewitness
identifies the suspect as the perpetrator”). I exclude from the scope of this article
identifications that occur under judicial oversight and in the presence of a judge or
jury, such as an in-court identification.

2017

“A Middle Temperature Between the Two”

399

overview of the present due process test for evaluating the
admissibility of extrajudicial eyewitness identifications, the present
Maryland iteration of that test, and alternatives to that approach that
have been adopted in other jurisdictions.8 Part III reviews recent
legislative reforms to extrajudicial identification procedures, which
are required in Maryland as of January 1, 2016.9 Section IV.A of this
article argues why a criminal defendant who has been identified in an
extrajudicial procedure that does not comply with that legislative
mandate should be afforded remedies short of suppression as a way
to induce compliance with the legislative mandate and to better avoid
wrongful conviction and the dire societal harms which occur when
the true culprit is left free to re-offend.10 Section IV.B of this article
provides an overview of the remedies a criminal defendant should be
entitled to receive if that defendant shows that he or she was
identified in an extrajudicial identification procedure that does not
comply with the present statutory requirements.11
This article suggests that if a criminal defendant shows that law
enforcement did not meaningfully comply with a pertinent statutory
provision regarding an extrajudicial identification procedure, that
defendant may (1) seek to limit the introduction of that identification
on evidentiary grounds. The defendant should also be permitted, at
trial, to: (2) cross-examine the law enforcement officers concerning
the failure to employ the statutorily required procedures; (3)
introduce expert testimony to explain how the failure to employ these
procedures affect the reliability of the identification; (4) have the
court propound a jury instruction concerning the statutory
requirements and informing jurors that they may utilize the failure to
comply with the statute in evaluating the weight to afford the
identification; and (5) argue in closing argument that the failure to
comply with the statute impacts the weight jurors should give to the
identification.
This article advocates for the provision of limited remedies short of
suppression of the identification12 as a means to both ensure
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Section IV.A. Given that the statute requires law enforcement agencies to
adopt and implement these reforms by January 1, 2016, the remedies suggested in
this article apply only if the identification procedure was administered after that date,
and should not be available if the identification procedure was administered before
January 1, 2016.
See infra Section IV.B.
Although this article suggests that a defendant may seek an in limine ruling to
exclude an identification on evidentiary grounds, this article uses the term
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enforcement of the legislative mandate regarding extrajudicial
identification procedures and to achieve the highest goals of our
criminal justice system: to ensure the guilty are identified, convicted,
and punished, and to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction.
An honest, but incorrect, identification results in two independent
transgressions of these values: when an innocent person is wrongly
convicted, a guilty person remains free and at risk to re-offend.
While a wrongful conviction produces an individualized and ad hoc
harm, the fact that a dangerous criminal remains free harms society at
large, including anyone who may be later victimized by that criminal.
There will likely never be an adequate test to positively
differentiate an accurate identification from an inaccurate
identification.13 Indeed, for a defense attorney, that is often the most
vexing issue in examining an eyewitness; the witness truly believes
that his or her identification is correct when, in reality, it is not. The
issue is not one of veracity, but accuracy. Thus, the best salve for
honest, but incorrect, misidentification is to endeavor to improve the
accuracy of the procedures that produce those identifications, and to
increase the “probabilistic” chances that the identification will be
accurate.14
The General Assembly has required a series of procedures, which
are designed to produce more reliable identifications. A more
reliable procedure produces a more reliable result; the utilization of
these procedures should result in identifications that better identify
the guilty and avoid the identification of the innocent. If law
enforcement agencies adopt and implement these procedures, the
values of our criminal justice system are served in full. A defendant
is entitled to no remedy if law enforcement complies with the statute,
and the best way to obviate any of the remedies proposed in this
article is to do what law enforcement should be doing: comply with
the General Assembly’s required procedures regarding extrajudicial

13.

14.

“suppression” exclusively to refer to the exclusion of an identification on the
constitutional due process grounds outlined in Sections II.A. and II.B. See
discussion infra Sections II.A–B.1.
Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 417 (Alaska 2016) (“[T]he science of eyewitness
identifications is ‘probabilistic’; it cannot say for certain whether any particular
identification is accurate but rather identifies the variables that are relevant to
evaluating the risk of a misidentification.”); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 690 (Or.
2012) (“[A]lthough the scientific studies we have reviewed have identified a number
of factors that contribute to the likelihood of mistaken identification, nearly all of
those factors are probabilistic in nature—they can indicate only a statistical
likelihood of misidentification within a broad population of people studied, not
whether any one identification is right or wrong.”).
See Young, 374 P.3d at 417; Lawson, 291 P.3d at 690.

2017

“A Middle Temperature Between the Two”

401

identification procedures. However, as previous legislative entries
into this area have shown, the law enforcement community does not
always comply with these legislative mandates. If law enforcement
agencies do not adopt these policies, or individual officers fail to
adhere to the required procedures in creating and administering an
individual extrajudicial identification procedure, the criminal
defendant identified in that procedure should be permitted a series of
limited remedies to level the playing field, temper the effect of
unreliable identification procedures, and to induce law enforcement
compliance with these legislative mandates.
Confession of Potential Bias
The reader will soon learn that, as a matter of federal due process, a
criminal defendant is entitled to suppress an extrajudicial
identification only if he or she shows that law enforcement arranged
an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure that resulted in
an irreparably unreliable identification. Although other jurisdictions
have adopted different tests, which allow suppression of an
identification based upon other showings, the Maryland Court of
Appeals recently rejected adoption of those approaches and retained
the present due process approach in Smiley v. State.15
The author was the attorney who argued for that change in Smiley.
I lost. While I am proud of my work in that case, I do not seek to relitigate the case in the article. As a practicing attorney, I took an oath
to be faithful to the laws of this State and, as a professional, I have
the utmost respect for the highest court of our state. This article does
not criticize the decision in Smiley; the Court of Appeals held that the
Maryland Declaration of Rights does not require any change to the
present constitutional standard used to evaluate the suppression of an
identification; that decision was eminently reasonable; causa finita
est.
This article, therefore, is based upon the premise that total
suppression of an extrajudicial identification will not occur unless a
criminal defendant shows that the identification violates due process
principles. Nevertheless, as this article will explain, the Maryland
General Assembly has entered the field of extrajudicial identification
procedures, and has required—as a matter of law, and as a matter of
Maryland public policy—a series of practices that are both based on
the best present scientific understandings of eyewitness memory and
15.

111 A.3d 43, 56 (Md. 2015).

402

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 46

identification, which should produce more reliable identifications.
This article seeks only to encourage and induce compliance with that
legislative mandate. Just as I write in total fidelity to the decisions of
the Maryland Court of Appeals, I write to encourage equal fidelity to
the requirements established by the legislative branch of our tripartite
government.
I also write this article to encourage the exploration of remedies
short of the total suppression remedy examined in Smiley. Since the
creation of the due process standard nearly five decades ago, the
evaluation of the admissibility of an eyewitness identification has
been viewed in the all-or-nothing prism of suppression. Given that
the Court of Appeals has retained the very high standard for
constitutional suppression, it is incumbent upon defense attorneys to
explore other more limited remedies if they are unable to satisfy that
high burden. The time is particularly ripe for this exploration, given
that the General Assembly has required very specific procedures that
aim to obtain more reliable extrajudicial identifications. The new
legislatively required procedures are a necessary fulcrum for every
proposal in this article.
This article is therefore written in the very recent milieu of judicial
retention of the existing due process standard for suppression of an
identification and legislative adoption of particular procedures for
obtaining extrajudicial identifications. The author criticizes neither
approach; to the contrary, he writes only to encourage executive—
law enforcement—compliance with the dictates of both coequal
branches of government and to achieve the highest goals of our
criminal justice system: the rightful punishment of the truly guilty
and rightful acquittal of the truly innocent.
II. THE PRESENT TEST FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS
A. The United States Supreme Court’s Due Process Analysis
For nearly a half-century, as a matter of federal due process, a
criminal defendant has been protected “against the introduction of
evidence of, or tainted by, unreliable pretrial identifications obtained
through unnecessarily suggestive procedures.”16
The Supreme Court’s first foray into the constitutional implications
of an eyewitness identification procedure stressed the importance of
the assistance of counsel during the procedure. In United States v.
Wade, the Supreme Court first recognized that “the confrontation
16.

Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 227 (1977).
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compelled by the State between the accused and the victim or
witnesses to a crime to elicit identification evidence is peculiarly
riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might
seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial.”17 In Wade, the
Court’s chief concern was the “manner in which the prosecution
present[ed] the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification,”18 and
the attendant recognition “that, once a witness has picked out the
accused at the line-up, he is not likely to go back on his word later
on.”19 Thus, the Court ultimately found that due to the “grave
potential for prejudice, intentional or not, in the pretrial lineup,”20 the
accused was entitled to the aid and presence of counsel at a postindictment, in-person lineup procedure.21
In the companion case of Stovall v. Denno,22 the Court also
addressed the independent contention that “the confrontation . . . was
so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification that he was denied due process of law,” independent of
any right to the presence of counsel at that procedure.23 Thus, apart
from the right to counsel at an in-person lineup, the Court recognized
an independent due process protection against an “unnecessarily
suggestive” identification procedure.24
In this wellspring, however, the Court rejected the per se exclusion
of an identification obtained in violation of either the right to counsel
or due process. Rather, the Court fashioned a test which allowed the
prosecution to adduce evidence of an in-court identification if, after
consideration of a variety of factors,25 the ultimate in-court

17.
18.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
Id. at 228–29 (“A commentator has observed that ‘[t]he influence of improper
suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriages of
justice than any other single factor—perhaps it is responsible for more such errors
than all other factors combined.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting PATRICK M.
WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 26 (1965)).
Id. at 229.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 236–37.
388 U.S. 293 (1967).
Id. at 301–02.
Id.
Wade, 388 U.S. at 241 (“Application of this test in the present context requires
consideration of various factors; for example, the prior opportunity to observe the
alleged criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup
description and the defendant’s actual description, any identification prior to lineup
of another person, the identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup,
failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between
the alleged act and the lineup identification. It is also relevant to consider those facts
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identifications were based on the witness’ observations, and not the
unnecessarily suggestive lineup.26
In these initial cases, the Supreme Court noted that “[a] conviction
which rests on a mistaken identification is a gross miscarriage of
justice,”27 and therefore, the rules it announced were “aimed at
minimizing that possibility by preventing the unfairness at the pretrial
confrontation that experience has proved can occur . . . .”28 Within a
few years, it spurned both this consideration of the “unfairness” of
the proceeding and focus upon the presence of counsel.29
The next term, the Court elucidated upon the due process approach
espoused in Stovall,30 and disallowed an identification that occurred
after a procedure where “[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the
witness, ‘This is the man,’”31 and “the pretrial confrontations clearly
were so arranged as to make the resulting identifications virtually
inevitable.”32 The Court also extended these principles beyond the
in-person lineup that term. In Simmons v. United States, the Court
recognized both the utility of, and the potential dangers in,
photographic identification procedures33 and held “that convictions
based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial
identification by photograph will be set aside . . . only if the
photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly
suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification.”34 Thus, in Simmons, the Court
recognized that only the due process check on suggestive

26.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

which, despite the absence of counsel, are disclosed concerning the conduct of the
lineup.”).
Id. at 240. In the companion case of Gilbert v. California, the Supreme Court also
afforded the petitioner a remand to the lower court for it to discern whether the intrial identifications of Gilbert had an independent source other than the pretrial
lineup which was conducted without counsel. 388 U.S. 263, 272–73 (1967). The
Gilbert Court did conclude that testimony about the lineup procedure—conducted
without counsel—was the direct fruit of that procedure and should be suppressed.
Id. at 273.
Stovall, 388 U.S. at 297.
Id. at 297–98 (“[T]he Wade and Gilbert rules also are aimed at avoiding unfairness
at the trial by enhancing the reliability of the fact-finding process in the area of
identification evidence . . . .”).
Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442–43 (1969).
Id. at 442. The Court again recognized that the conduct of identification procedures
may be “‘so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification’ as to be a denial of due process of law.” Id.
Id. at 443.
Id.
390 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1968).
Id. at 384.
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identification procedures recognized in Stovall applied to an
extrajudicial photographic array.
A few terms later, the Court held that the right to counsel at a
lineup, as recognized in Wade and Gilbert, applied only to postindictment lineups.35 As to identification procedures which occurred
prior to the filing of charges, the only recourse was, again, the due
process grounds recognized in Simmons.36 Within a few terms, the
Court also rejected the proposition “that the risks inherent in the use
of photographic displays are so pernicious that an extraordinary
system of safeguards is required,”37 and held “that the Sixth
Amendment does not grant the right to counsel at photographic
displays conducted by the Government for the purpose of allowing a
witness to attempt an identification of the offender.”38
Within this series of cases, the Court shifted its primary attention to
the due process analysis first recognized in Stovall. This approach
came to maturity in Neil v. Biggers39 and Manson v. Brathwaite.40 In
Neil v. Biggers, the Court recognized a “relationship between
suggestiveness and misidentification” and observed “that the primary
evil to be avoided is ‘a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.’”41
Thus, the Court opined, it is only an
impermissibly suggestive procedure that creates a likelihood of
misidentification, which violates due process.42 The Court also
iterated that the central issue was “whether under the ‘totality of the
circumstances’ the identification was reliable even though the
confrontation procedure was suggestive.”43 After putting forward a
variety of factors to be used in assessing whether the identification
was reliable44 and examining them in the case at hand, the Court
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972).
Id.
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973).
Id.
409 U.S. 188, 196–200 (1972).
432 U.S. 98, 109–14 (1977).
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384
(1968)).
Id. (“Suggestive confrontations are disapproved because they increase the likelihood
of misidentification, and unnecessarily suggestive ones are condemned for the
further reason that the increased chance of misidentification is gratuitous.”).
Id. at 199.
Id. at 199–200 (“As indicated by our cases, the factors to be considered in evaluating
the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the
witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation.”).
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found that an identification was admissible because there was “no
substantial likelihood of misidentification.”45
In Manson v. Brathwaite, the Supreme Court focused upon
procedures which were both suggestive and unnecessary.46 The
Court also viewed per se exclusion of the product of suggestive
identification procedure as “a Draconian sanction.”47 Rather, the
Court “conclude[d] that reliability is the linchpin in determining the
admissibility of identification testimony,”48 and the assessment of the
overall reliability of the identification—after considering the factors
announced in Neil v. Biggers—was to be weighed against the
“corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.”49
For the next third of a century, there were no major modifications
to these rules. In Perry v. New Hampshire,50 however, the Court
placed additional limitations upon the suppression of a pretrial
identification. Specifically, the Court opined that its extant due
process limitation upon identifications was only “applicable when the
police have arranged suggestive circumstances leading the witness to
identify a particular person as the perpetrator of a crime.”51 After
reviewing its prior cases on the issue, the Court iterated that “due
process concerns arise only when law enforcement officers use an
identification procedure that is both suggestive and unnecessary.”52
Even when such a procedure is employed, the Court noted, due
process “requires courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether
improper police conduct created a ‘substantial likelihood of
misidentification.’”53
The Court further noted that the “due process check for
reliability . . . comes into play only after the defendant establishes
improper police conduct.”54 To this end, the Court offered that “[a]
primary aim of excluding identification evidence obtained under
unnecessarily suggestive circumstances . . . is to deter law
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 201.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 99 (1977).
Id. at 112–13.
Id. at 114.
Id.
565 U.S. 228, 248 (2012).
Id. at 232.
Id. at 238–39 (first citing Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 107, 109; and then citing Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972)).
Id. at 239 (first quoting Biggers, 409 U.S. at 201; and then citing Brathwaite, 432
U.S. at 116)).
Id. at 241. In dissent, Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority for adding to the due
process analysis “a novel and significant limitation on our longstanding rule”
requiring “a degree of intentional orchestration or manipulation.” Id. at 254–55
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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enforcement use of improper lineups, showups, and photo arrays in
the first place”55 and thus identified a “deterrence rationale” as a
primary motivation for the due process check on impermissibly
suggestive identification procedures.56
In responding to the more recent research on eyewitness memory,
the Court noted it “d[id] not doubt either the importance or the
fallibility of eyewitness identifications,”57 but concluded “that the
potential unreliability of a type of evidence does not alone render its
introduction at the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.”58 The
Court therefore emphasized reliance upon “other safeguards built into
our adversary system that caution juries against placing undue weight
on eyewitness testimony of questionable reliability,”59 including: (1)
the right to confront the eyewitness;60 (2) the right to effective
assistance of counsel, and to counsel’s ability in cross-examination to
“expose the flaws in the eyewitness’ testimony during crossexamination”;61 (3) counsel’s ability to “focus the jury’s attention on
the fallibility of such testimony during opening and closing
arguments”;62 (4) jury instructions that “warn the jury to take care in
appraising identification evidence”;63 (5) the use of expert testimony
“on the hazards of eyewitness identification evidence”;64 and (6)
reliance upon traditional rules of evidence, which “permit trial judges
to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial impact or potential for misleading the
jury.”65
Thus, while the Supreme Court retained the due process test for the
exclusion of an identification, it identified the other “safeguards built
into our adversary system” as areas in which the defense may
challenge unreliable eyewitness identifications.66

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 241 (majority opinion) (citing Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112).
Id. at 241–42.
Id. at 244–45.
Id. at 245 (citing Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594 n.* (2009)).
Id.
Id. (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990)).
Id. at 246.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558–59 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per
curiam)).
Id. at 247 (citing State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1113 (Utah 2009)).
Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 403; N.H. R. EVID. 403).
Id. at 232, 245.
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B. The Maryland Retention of the Supreme Court’s Due Process
Analysis
Maryland has adopted, and retained, the due process approach
espoused by the Supreme Court. Specifically, under Maryland law
there is a “two-step” inquiry a court must conduct in determining
whether to suppress an extrajudicial identification.67 First, a court
must determine if the identification procedure was impermissibly
suggestive.68 In this inquiry, a court should be mindful that
“[s]uggestiveness can arise during the presentation of a photo array
when the manner itself of presenting the array to the witness or the
makeup of the array indicates which photograph the witness should
identify.”69 If the defendant makes this showing, the burden shifts to
the prosecution to show that,70 under the totality of the circumstances,
the identification is nevertheless reliable.71 In examining the
underlying reliability of the identification, Maryland courts rely upon
the factors announced in Neil v. Biggers.72
In Smiley v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals was presented
with, and rejected, a request to adopt some of the approaches adopted
in other jurisdictions.73 The Court of Appeals “decline[d] to do so,
because this Court, as well as the Court of Special Appeals, have
consistently
reaffirmed
application
of
the
[two-step]
67.
68.
69.

70.

71.
72.

73.

Smiley v. State, 111 A.3d 43, 49–50 (Md. 2015) (citing Jones v. State, 530 A.2d
743, 747 (Md. 1987)).
Id. at 50 (citing Jones, 530 A.2d at 747). The defense has the burden of making this
initial showing. Graves v. State, 619 A.2d 123, 139 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993);
Loud v. State, 493 A.2d 1092, 1094 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
Id. (first citing Jones, 530 A.2d at 747; and then citing Conyers v. State, 691 A.2d
802, 806 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997)). The Court of Special Appeals has also made
clear that, in this inquiry, “[t]he sin is to contaminate the test by slipping the answer
to the testee.” Conyers, 691 A.2d at 806.
The prosecution has the burden to “prove by clear and convincing evidence the
existence of reliability in the identification that outweighs the corrupting effect of the
suggestive procedure.” Loud, 493 A.2d at 1094 (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432
U.S. 98 (1977); Godwin v. State, 382 A.2d 596 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Smith v.
State, 250 A.2d 285 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969)).
Smiley, 111 A.3d at 50 (citing Jones v. State, 909 A.2d 650, 658 (Md. 2006)).
See Jones, 530 A.2d at 747; see also Thomas v. State, 74 A.3d 746, 763–64 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2013); In re Matthew S., 23 A.3d 250, 256 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011);
Wood v. State, 7 A.3d 1115, 1123–24 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010). Further, “[t]hese
factors are to be considered within the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
identification.” Brockington v. State, 582 A.2d 568, 572 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990)
(citing Foster v. State, 323 A.2d 419 (Md. 1974); Green v. State, 558 A.2d 441 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1989)).
Smiley, 111 A.3d at 51–53. Specifically, petitioner proposed adoption of the
standard similar to that adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Henderson.
State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011); see infra note 84 and accompanying
text.
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procedure . . . for examining challenges to the admissibility of
eyewitness identifications.”74 The Court further iterated “our
jurisprudence already provides suitable means to assay an eyewitness
identification”75 and thus hewed to the extant two-step due process
test used to assess the admissibility of extrajudicial identifications.
C. Alternative Approaches Adopted by other Jurisdictions
While the Supreme Court76 and Maryland77 have stood by the
existing due process approach used to evaluate the admissibility of
extrajudicial identifications, and have rejected invitations to modify
this approach, other jurisdictions have experimented with alternative
tests. This experimentation finds its basis in two developments,
which have occurred since the due process approach obtained
maturity in Manson v. Brathwaite:78 (1) the recognition that honest,
but erroneous, identifications are the leading cause of wrongful
convictions; and (2) the development of a wealth of social science,
which has endeavored to understand how eyewitness memories are
formed, stored, and retrieved.79 The jurisdictions that now examine
and suppress eyewitness identifications on grounds other than the
federal due process approach do so either on state constitutional
grounds, or through application of state evidentiary law.80
74.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Smiley, 111 A.3d at 52. The Court referred to its decision in (Gregory) Jones as its
wellspring for this approach. The Court had actually adopted the Supreme Court’s
due process analysis a year earlier in Webster v. State, 474 A.2d 1305, 1314–16 (Md.
1984).
Smiley, 111 A.3d at 53.
Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 234, 245 (2012).
Smiley, 111 A.3d at 49–50.
See 432 U.S. 98, 113–14 (1977).
See State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 299–300 (Tenn. 2007).
By “different grounds,” I mean grounds other than the “two-step” process required
under Maryland and Supreme Court case law, which requires an initial showing of
impermissible suggestiveness and then assesses whether the resulting identification
is independently reliable. See discussion supra Sections II.A–B. I exclude from this
discussion those jurisdictions, such as New York and Massachusetts, who have
adopted a “rule of per se exclusion of evidence from unnecessarily suggestive pretrial identification procedures.” Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, The Promises and Pitfalls
of State Eyewitness Identification Reforms, 104 KY. L.J. 99, 122 (2015). Wisconsin
has also adopted a rule of per se exclusion which “applies only to unnecessarily
suggestive, in-person, pre-trial showups and not to any other kind of identification
procedure.” Id. at 139. Utah and Kansas have abandoned the Manson approach
“through modification of the reliability factors used to decide whether identification
evidence is admissible despite the use of an unnecessarily suggestive procedure.” Id.
at 146. These jurisdictions all require a predicate showing of suggestive pre-trial
procedure (i.e., the first step of Maryland’s “two-step” approach), and have either
eliminated, or modified, the second step of the existing analysis. North Carolina and
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1. Reasons for the Adoption of New Standards
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding the due process
checks upon extrajudicial eyewitness identification procedures
reached maturity when Manson v. Brathwaite was decided in 1977.81
In the intervening four decades there have been two critical
developments that have caused other jurisdictions to examine
alternative approaches to evaluating the admissibility of extrajudicial
identifications. The first is the advent of DNA technology,
corresponding exonerations of wrongly convicted individuals, and the
recognition that eyewitness misidentification is the leading cause of
wrongful conviction.82 Indeed, “erroneous identifications [a]re
responsible for more wrongful convictions than any other single
factor.”83
DNA-based exonerations have provided an X-ray
examination of the criminal justice system that has exposed latent
flaws and a corresponding need for remedy in a system previously
thought to be in much better health.
Second, there is a field of social science that has endeavored to
understand how eyewitness memories are formed, stored, and
retrieved; thus, this helps identify factors that may produce an honest,
though incorrect, identification. This “vast body of scientific
research about human memory has emerged” in the decades since the
Supreme Court adopted the present test and “casts doubt on some
commonly held views relating to memory,” as well as “the vitality of
the current legal framework for analyzing the reliability of
eyewitness identifications.”84

81.
82.

83.
84.

Ohio have adopted a series of statutory requirements for extrajudicial eyewitness
identification procedures, and these statutes “require judges to consider
noncompliance when adjudicating suppression motions and . . . require judges to
instruct juries that they may consider noncompliance in evaluating the reliability of
eyewitness evidence.” Id. at 150. This article is necessitated by the fact that the
Maryland statute, unlike the North Carolina or Ohio statutes, provides for no remedy
or enforcement mechanism.
See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 113–14.
See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 8–9 (2011) (documenting that in 190 of the first 250
DNA-based exonerations (76%), the conviction was based on an incorrect
eyewitness identification); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 690 n.5 (Or. 2012);
Copeland, 226 S.W.3d at 299.
N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION’S
TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 45 (2009),
https://www.nysba.org/wcreport/; see Bomas v. State, 987 A.2d 98, 109 (Md. 2010).
State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 877 (N.J. 2011) (first citing Brathwaite, 432 U.S.
at 114; and then citing State v. Madison, 536 A.2d 254 (N.J.1988)); see also id. at
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The conflux of these two factors—the realization that honest, but
incorrect, identifications are the leading cause of wrongful
conviction, and the identification of the factors which can produce (or
reduce) those incorrect identifications—have caused other
jurisdictions to reevaluate the efficacy of the present due process
standard as the sole check on the admissibility of an extrajudicial
identification.
2. State Constitutional Limitations on the Admissibility of
Eyewitness Identifications
In State v. Henderson, the Supreme Court of New Jersey became
the first court to utilize a state constitution to make inroads on the
federal due process test adopted by the United States Supreme
Court.85 In Henderson, after the parties questioned the efficacy of the
present standard, the Supreme Court of New Jersey remanded the
case for an evidentiary hearing where “[t]he parties and amici
collectively produced more than 360 exhibits, which included more
than 200 published scientific studies on human memory and
eyewitness identification.”86 At this hearing, the prosecution and
defense communities both presented an array of social scientists who
identified “broad consensus within the scientific community on the
relevant scientific issues”87 and the “gold standard in terms of the
applicability of social science research to the law.”88 This social
science was vetted through both peer reviews and meta-analysis
reviews, which collate and evaluate all available data in a specified
topic area.89 The Supreme Court of New Jersey ultimately adopted

85.
86.
87.
88.

89.

892 (“Virtually all of the scientific evidence . . . emerged after Manson.”); Lawson,
291 P.3d at 678 (noting that in the past three decades, “there have been considerable
developments in both the law and the science on which this court previously relied in
determining the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence” and, in light of
those developments, “revis[ing] the test” for admissibility).
See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919 & n.10.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 884–85, 911.
Id. at 916. The Henderson and Lawson decisions provide an excellent overview of
the scientific research regarding eyewitness memory and identification. See id. at
892–912; Lawson, 291 P.3d at 700–11. Professor Kahn-Fogel has also provided an
excellent précis of the present state of the social science concerning eyewitness
memory and identification. See Kahn-Fogel, supra note 80, at 109–20. This
underlying science is beyond the scope of this article, and these decisions and article
are commended to the reader who wishes to read more about the social science
which has caused several jurisdictions (and the Maryland General Assembly) to
reform eyewitness identification procedures.
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 892–93.
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the report issued by the hearing judge and credited this scientific
research as “convincing proof that the current test for evaluating the
trustworthiness of eyewitness identifications should be revised.”90
After reviewing the social science concerning eyewitness memory
and identification, the Henderson court ultimately concluded “that
eyewitnesses generally act in good faith” and that “[m]ost
misidentifications stem from the fact that human memory is
malleable; they are not the result of malice.”91 This is because
“memory is a constructive, dynamic, and selective process,” which
“consists of three stages,” —acquisition, retention, and retrieval—and
“[a]t each of those stages, the information ultimately offered as
‘memory’ can be distorted, contaminated and even falsely
imagined.”92 Indeed, “an array of variables can affect and dilute
[eyewitness] memory and lead to misidentifications.”93
The
scientific community and the Henderson court divide these variables
into two groups: (1) “[s]ystem variables,” which “are factors like
lineup procedures which are within the control of the criminal justice
system”;94 and (2) “[e]stimator variables,” which “are factors related
to the witness, the perpetrator, or the event itself—like distance,
lighting, or stress—over which the legal system has no control.”95
System variables—which are the factors entirely within the control
of the criminal justice system and law enforcement community—
include the following factors:
1. Blind Administration: Was the lineup procedure
performed double-blind?
If double-blind testing was
impractical, did the police use a technique . . . to ensure that
the administrator had no knowledge of where the suspect
appeared in the photo array or lineup?
2. Pre-identification Instructions: Did the administrator
provide neutral, pre-identification instructions warning that
the suspect may not be present in the lineup and that the
witness should not feel compelled to make an identification?
3. Lineup Construction: Did the array or lineup contain only
one suspect embedded among at least five innocent fillers?
Did the suspect stand out from other members of the lineup?

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 877.
Id. at 888.
Id. at 894.
Id. at 895.
Id.
Id.
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4. Feedback: Did the witness receive any information or
feedback, about the suspect or the crime, before, during, or
after the identification procedure?
5. Recording Confidence: Did the administrator record the
witness’ statement of confidence immediately after the
identification, before the possibility of any confirmatory
feedback?
6. Multiple Viewings: Did the witness view the suspect
more than once as part of multiple identification
procedures? Did police use the same fillers more than once?
7. Showups: Did the police perform a showup more than
two hours after an event? Did the police warn the witness
that the suspect may not be the perpetrator and that the
witness should not feel compelled to make an identification?
8. Private Actors: Did law enforcement elicit from the
eyewitness whether he or she had spoken with anyone about
the identification and, if so, what was discussed?
9. Other Identifications Made: Did the eyewitness initially
make no choice or choose a different suspect or filler?96
Estimator variables, which are the factors related to the witness,
the perpetrator, or the event, which the legal system cannot control,
include factors such as:
1. Stress: Did the event involve a high level of stress?
2. Weapon focus: Was a visible weapon used during a crime
of short duration?
3. Duration: How much time did the witness have to observe
the event?
4. Distance and Lighting: How close were the witness and
perpetrator? What were the lighting conditions at the time?
5. Witness Characteristics: Was the witness under the
influence of alcohol or drugs? Was age a relevant factor
under the circumstances of the case?
6. Characteristics of Perpetrator: Was the culprit wearing a
disguise? Did the suspect have different facial features at
the time of the identification?
7. Memory [D]ecay: How much time elapsed between the
crime and the identification?

96.

Id. at 920–21. There is an excellent overview of the science animating the adoption
of these factors in Lawson. State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 686–87 (Or. 2012).
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8. Racial Bias: Does the case involve a cross-racial
identification?97
The list of estimator variables also includes the five factors
announced in Neil v. Biggers, which are presently used to assess the
ultimate reliability of an identification.98
After reviewing this science, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
ultimately concluded in Henderson that the present due process
approach “does not adequately meet its stated goals: it does not
provide a sufficient measure for reliability, it does not deter, and it
overstates the jury’s innate ability to evaluate eyewitness
testimony.”99 Thus, as a matter of state constitutional law,100 the
court rejected the present approach and replaced it with one that
“addresses its shortcomings,”101 “allows judges to consider all
relevant factors that affect reliability in deciding whether an
identification is admissible,”102 minimizes “factors that can be
corrupted by suggestiveness,”103 and thus, “promotes deterrence in a
meaningful way” and “help[s] jurors both understand and evaluate
the effects that various factors have on memory.”104
Under the approach adopted in Henderson, the defendant still has
the prima facie burden to demonstrate that an identification
procedure was impermissibly suggestive, but may make that
showing by establishing the presence of any “system variable.”105 If
the defendant shows that the procedure was suggestive by proving
the presence of a system variable, the burden shifts to the State to
show the reliability of the identification.106 In evaluating reliability,
“courts should consider . . . system variables as well as the . . . nonexhaustive list of estimator variables to evaluate the overall
reliability of an identification and determine its admissibility.”107
To reiterate, this approach does not alter the current regime in
which the defendant must first prove that the identification procedure
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921. Again, Lawson provides a very comprehensive
overview of the science behind the adoption of these factors. Lawson, 291 P.3d at
687–88.
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921–22 (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200
(1972)).
Id. at 918.
Id. at 919 n.10.
Id. at 919.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 920.
Id.
Id. at 921.
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was impermissibly suggestive, and if so, the identification is
suppressed unless the State can establish that the identification is
independently reliable. That remains unchanged. The only
alteration is that the evaluation of suggestiveness now considers the
presence of any “system variable,” such as the factors “within the
control of the criminal justice system,”108 and the assessment of
reliability includes both those considerations, as well as any
“estimator variables,” which “are factors related to the witness, the
perpetrator, or the event itself—like distance, lighting, or stress—
over which the legal system has no control.”109 That is the only
change announced in Henderson.
New Jersey is not the only jurisdiction that has spurned the present
due process approach—which is triggered again only upon a
showing that “police have arranged suggestive circumstances leading
the witness to identify a particular person as the perpetrator of a
crime”110—in favor of a test which requires the defendant to show
only the presence of a “system variable.” Idaho has done so, finding
that the use of system and estimator variables “dovetail[s] nicely
with the two-step analysis this Court applies to determine whether
evidence of an out-of-court identification violates due process.”111
More recently, the Supreme Court of Alaska has held that the due
process protections of the Alaska constitution required the court to
depart from the federal due process approach.112 In so doing, the
court noted that “[d]evelopments in the science related to the
reliability of eyewitness identifications” undermined its confidence
in the existing due process test as being sufficiently protective of a
defendant’s due process rights.113 In this regard, the Young court
noted that the current due process approach “does not adequately
assess reliability” and fails to consider many of the factors that are
now known to affect the reliability of an eyewitness identification.114
The court ultimately adopted an approach modeled off of the
Henderson approach, in which the defendant must present “some
evidence” of suggestiveness in the procedure that is tied to the
presence of a system variable.115 The court noted that “a defendant
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 895.
Id.
Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 231–32 (2012).
State v. Almaraz, 301 P.3d 242, 252 (Idaho 2013).
See Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 412–13 (Alaska 2016).
Id. at 413.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 427.
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need not show that a procedure was ‘unnecessarily suggestive’ in
order to get a hearing; that the identification involved a system
variable is itself enough to trigger that process.”116 Upon such a
showing, the burden shifts to the State to adduce evidence that the
identification is nevertheless reliable.117 A court undertaking this
inquiry “should consider all relevant system and estimator variables
under the totality of the circumstances” and “should not hesitate to
take expert testimony that explains, supplements, or challenges the
application of these variables to different fact situations.”118
Ultimately, the defendant bears the burden of showing a “very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”119 The court
also noted that if the defendant fails to make this showing, the court
should admit the identification but “provide the jury with an
instruction appropriate to the context of the case.”120
3. State Evidentiary Limitations on the Admissibility of
Extrajudicial Identifications
Other jurisdictions have recognized the utility of employing
system and estimator variables in assessing the admissibility of
eyewitness identifications, but have done so under state evidentiary
principles. In State v. Lawson,121 the Supreme Court of Oregon
refrained from addressing the continuing viability of the test for the
constitutional admissibility of an identification because the test was
“inconsistent with modern scientific findings” and “at odds with its
own goals and with current Oregon evidence law.”122 Under the
approach adopted in Lawson, a court presumes that an identification
is relevant and admissible if the proponent establishes that the
witness “had an adequate opportunity to observe or otherwise
personally perceive” the facts relating to the identification, and that
the identification is both rationally based on those perceptions and
helpful to the fact finder.123 Once the proponent establishes the
prima facie relevance of the identification, the court is tasked with
evaluating the relative probity of that identification by assessing its
reliability, cognizant that “[t]he more factors—the presence of
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The court also tasked the Alaska Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions Committee
with drafting a model instruction consistent with the principles reviewed in the
court’s decision. Id. at 428.
291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012).
Id. at 688.
See id. at 692.
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system variables alone or in combination with estimator variables—
that weigh against reliability of the identification, the less persuasive
the identification evidence will be to prove the fact of
identification.”124 The relative probity must then be assessed against
the potential for unfair prejudice, recognizing that “eyewitness
identifications subjected to suggestive police procedures are
particularly susceptible to concerns of unfair prejudice” and that “in
cases in which an eyewitness has been exposed to suggestive police
procedures, trial courts have a heightened role as an evidentiary
gatekeeper because ‘traditional’ methods of testing reliability—like
cross-examination—can be ineffective at discrediting unreliable or
inaccurate eyewitness identification evidence.”125 The court may
then either exclude the identification in toto, or has discretion to
exclude particular aspects of the identifications that are especially
prejudicial or unreliable.126
4. The Primary Distinctions of the Alternative Approaches
The state constitutional approach and the state evidentiary
approach share the common denominator of utilizing system and
estimator variables to assess the admissibility of an eyewitness
identification. In New Jersey, Alaska, and Idaho, those variables are
used to assess whether the identification should be suppressed as a
constitutional matter. In Oregon, they are relevant in assessing the
relative probity of the identification, the potential for unfair
prejudice (viz., an erroneous identification), and ultimately, the
evidentiary admissibility of the identification. In each jurisdiction
these variables, which rely upon and reflect the present “gold
standard” of social science research, guide courts in assessing the
admissibility of an identification and help ensure that reliable
identifications are presented to a jury.
There are additional aspects of these alternative approaches which
differentiate them from the present due process approach. First, the
courts that have adopted these alternative tests recognize that the
system and estimator variables listed in the opinion “are not
exclusive. Nor are they intended to be frozen in time.”127 Rather,
Henderson “recognize[d] that scientific research relating to the
reliability of eyewitness evidence is dynamic” and did not “intend to
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 694.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 694–95, 697.
See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 922 (N.J. 2011).
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hamstring police departments or limit them from improving
practices” or preclude lower courts “from reviewing evolving,
substantial, and generally accepted scientific research.”128 Thus,
courts may “consider variables differently or entertain new ones” so
long as they “rely on reliable scientific evidence that is generally
accepted by experts in the community.”129 Likewise, Lawson notes
that it did not “intend[] to preclude any party in a specific case from
validating scientific acceptance of further research or from
challenging particular aspects of the research described in this
opinion.”130 Thus, these courts recognize that as law confronts
emerging science, the solution is dynamic progress, not static
entrenchment; this aggiornamento ensures that current law reflects
current science and ensures that the two develop in harmony.
One distinction of the approach developed in Oregon is that, unlike
the due process approach (or the state constitutional approach
championed in New Jersey), it does not pertain solely to
identification procedures arranged by law enforcement. Because the
due process approach is constitutional in nature, it requires a
showing of state action (viz., that law enforcement agents are the
ones who have arranged the suggestive circumstances).131 Under the
evidentiary approach adopted in Lawson, “there is no reason to
hinder the analysis of eyewitness reliability with purposeless
distinctions between suggestiveness and other sources of
unreliability.”132
The evidentiary approach espoused in Lawson relieves the
defendant from showing the presence of a suggestive identification
procedure.133 Rather, in tying the analysis to rules of evidence, the
Lawson court requires the proponent—the State, and not the
defendant—to show that this evidence has the requisite probity to be
submitted to the jury.134 This approach ultimately focuses on the
reliability of the identification and the quality of the evidence
submitted at trial, rather than focusing on the conduct of the police
officers in trying to impermissibly secure an identification from a
suggestive procedure.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id. (citing State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 136 (N.J. 2008); State v. Moore, 902 A.2d
1212, 1226 (N.J. 2006); Rubanick v. Wito Chem., 593 A.2d 733, 739 (N.J. 1991)).
Lawson, 291 P.3d at 686.
See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 231–32 (2012); Young v. State,
374 P.3d 395, 417 (Alaska 2016) (quoting Perry, 565 U.S. at 232).
Lawson, 291 P.3d at 688–89.
See id. at 693.
Id.
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III. MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE REFORMS TO EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
While the Supreme Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals have
rejected attempts to modify the due process strictures on
extrajudicial identification procedures, the Maryland General
Assembly has twice legislatively attempted to reform these
procedures in Maryland. Indeed, the General Assembly has now
required extrajudicial identification procedures that are fully in
keeping with the “estimator” and “system” variables recognized in
other jurisdictions such as New Jersey, Alaska, and Oregon. As this
article will explore further, the issue is not one of reform—
Maryland, by statute, requires extrajudicial identification procedures
that are in keeping with the state of the art knowledge of eyewitness
memory, recall, and identification. The issue, moving forward, is
how to ensure compliance with that reformational legislative
mandate.
In 2007, the Maryland General Assembly first entered the field of
extrajudicial identification procedures. Specifically, as of December
1, 2007, the General Assembly required “each law enforcement
agency in the State” to “adopt written policies relating to eyewitness
identification that comply with the United States Department of
Justice
standards
on
obtaining
accurate
eyewitness
identification[s].”135 The General Assembly further required each
law enforcement agency in the State to have the written policies on
file with the State Police by December 1, 2008136 and directed the
State Police to compile and allow public inspection of each policy.137
Thus, as of December 1, 2008, each law enforcement agency in
Maryland was required to adopt, and have on file, a policy pertaining
to eyewitness identification procedures that complied with the
Department of Justice’s best practices. These “best practices”
emanate from a comprehensive overview, Eyewitness Evidence, A
Guide for Law Enforcement, published by the Department of Justice
in 1999.138 This guide was authored by a working group comprised
135.
136.
137.
138.

MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-506(a) (LexisNexis 2011); H.B. 103, 2007 Leg.,
423rd Sess. (Md. 2007).
PUB. SAFETY § 3-506(b).
Id. §§ 3-506(c)(1)–(2).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A
GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999) [hereinafter Eyewitness Evidence],
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf. The Fiscal and Policy Note for the
statute requiring such policies referred to Eyewitness Evidence directly, noting that it
“detail[ed] recommended procedures for obtaining reliable eyewitness evidence
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of individuals from law enforcement, prosecution, defense, and
scientific research communities,139 and relied upon the existing
research concerning eyewitness memory and identification.140
The Eyewitness Evidence guide has sections pertaining to the
response of initial law enforcement responders,141 mug books,142
composite drawings,143 subsequent interviews with eyewitnesses,144
show-up identification procedures,145 and identification procedures,
such as an in-person or photographic lineup.146 With regard to
photographic identification procedures, Eyewitness Evidence
requires:
(1) the use of only one suspect in each procedure;147
(2) the selection of fillers who fit the description of the
perpetrator;148
(3) the use of a minimum of five fillers;149
(4) the avoidance of fillers who closely resemble the
suspect;150
(5) the presentation of a consistent appearance between the
suspect and the filler;151
(6) the placement of a suspect in a different position in each
lineup;152
(7) the use of new fillers in multiple lineups shown to the
same witness;153
(8) the avoidance of any information concerning previous
arrests;154
(9) the viewing of the array to ensure that the suspect does
not stand-out;155 and

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

through line-ups, field identifications, mug shot books, and other methods.” MD.
GEN. ASSEMBLY, PUBLIC SAFETY – EYEWITNESS WRITTEN POLICIES, H.B. 423103, at 2 (2007), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2007RS/fnotes/bil_0003/hb0103.pdf.
EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, supra note 138, at 5.
Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 13–16.
Id. at 17–20.
Id.
Id. at 21–25.
Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 29–38.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29–30.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
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(10) the preservation of the presentation order and
photographs used in the procedure.156
Eyewitness Evidence requires the use of instructions before the
identification procedure,157 requires police to avoid saying anything
to influence a selection or reporting to the witness any information
concerning the identification prior to obtaining a statement of
certainty,158 and requires documentation of the procedure, including
the date and time of the procedure, as well as the identification of all
those present.159 Finally, police are required to obtain a statement
concerning the witness’s identification,160 including any
identification or non-identification that results in writing, signed by
the witness, including a statement of certainty in the witness’s own
words.161
In 2014, the Maryland General Assembly again entered the area of
eyewitness identification procedures.162 Specifically, as of January
1, 2016,163 the General Assembly required “each law enforcement
agency in the State” to either “adopt the Police Training
Commission’s Eyewitness Identification Model Policy”164 or to
“adopt and implement a written policy relating to identification
procedures that complies with § 3-506.1 of this subtitle.”165 The
legislature further required each law enforcement agency to file a
copy of the policy with the Maryland State Police,166 and required
the State Police to compile these policies and have them available for
inspection by February 1, 2016.167

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 31–33.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 38.
Id.
MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, PUBLIC SAFETY – EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION –
PROCEDURES, H.B. 1200, 434th Sess., at 3 (2014).
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-506(d)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016).
Id. § 3-506(d)(1)(i)(1). The Police Training Commission is a part of the Maryland
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services. Id. § 3-202 (LexisNexis
2011). The Police Training Commission is charged with establishing standards and
accrediting a variety of training and certifications of law enforcement officers in the
state of Maryland. See id. § 3-207 (LexisNexis 2011 & Supp. 2016).
Id. § 3-506(d)(1)(i)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016).
Id. § 3-506(d)(1)(ii).
Id. §§ 3-506(d)(2)–(3).
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The General Assembly deferred to the model eyewitness
identification policy of the Police Training Commission,168 and
legislatively adopted a model eyewitness identification policy,169
requiring compliance with either policy by January 1, 2016.170 What
is significant about the legislative creation of these required policies
is that it (1) responded to the adoption of alternative methods for
assessing the admissibility of an extrajudicial identification and the
rejection of those methods by the Supreme Court, and (2) was a
legislative response to significant non-compliance with the General
Assembly’s previous mandate.
The statute’s legislative history noted that before the statute was
proposed, New Jersey had “issued sweeping new rules that make it
easier for criminal defendants to challenge eyewitness
identification.”171 The legislative history further noted that the
Supreme Court held in Perry that due process “does not require a
judge to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the reliability of an
eyewitness’s identification when law enforcement did not use
unnecessarily suggestive circumstances to procure the
identification.”172 The statute’s legislative history, therefore, shows
that the General Assembly deliberately sought to navigate between
the Scylla of the retention of the current due process approach in
Perry and the Charybdis of the more liberal approach espoused in
Henderson, and to adopt reforms in Maryland that lie between the
two approaches (i.e., “a middle temperature between the two”).173
The General Assembly also sought to legislatively reform
eyewitness identification procedures because of significant law
enforcement non-compliance with its prior legislative mandates. As
noted, since 2007 each law enforcement agency in Maryland had
been required to adopt a written policy which complied with the
Department of Justice’s best practices (codified in Eyewitness
Evidence).174 The Fiscal and Policy Note for the 2014 statute reports
that the Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project surveyed and analyzed each
written policy submitted pursuant to the prior statute and that
168.
169.
170.
171.

172.
173.
174.

See id. § 3-506(d)(1)(i)(1).
Id. §§ 3-506(d)(1)(i)(1)–(2), 3-506.1.
Id. § 3-506(d)(1).
MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, PUBLIC SAFETY – EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION –
PROCEDURES, H.B. 1200, 434th Sess., at 3 (2014). The fiscal note further relates
that, under Henderson, “whenever a defendant presents evidence that a witness’s
identification of a suspect was influenced in any way, a judge must hold a hearing to
consider a range of issues related to the validity of the identification.” Id.
Id. (citing Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 248 (2012)).
BRUGGER, supra note 1, at 3.
PUB. SAFETY § 3-506(a) (LexisNexis 2011).
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seventeen percent of all law enforcement agencies did not have any
written policies pertaining to identification procedures; thirty percent
of law enforcement agencies had policies that did not comply with
any of the key recommendations of the Department of Justice;
twenty-six percent of law enforcement agencies had a policy that
partially complied with the Department of Justice’s
recommendations; and only twenty-seven percent of law
enforcement agencies had adopted a policy that fully complied with
each of Department of Justice’s key recommendations.175 Again, it
must be repeated: forty-seven percent of law enforcement agencies
had not complied with the prior legislative mandate in any
meaningful way (by either not adopting a policy or adopting a policy
that did not comply with any requisite aspect of Eyewitness
Evidence), and only twenty-seven percent had fully complied with
the prior requirement. The review of the 2014 statute, and the
evaluation of whether remedies should be available to induce law
enforcement compliance with this statute,176 should therefore
consider that this statute was passed in response to significant law
enforcement non-compliance with the prior legislative reforms
pertaining to eyewitness identification procedures.
The legislative model policy, codified in Section 3-506.1, is
notable for the progressive changes in identification procedures
required by the General Assembly (which are well in keeping with
the science pertaining to system and estimator variables). The policy
requires the use of pre-identification instructions177 and requires the
administrator to “document in writing all identification statements
made by the eyewitness.”178 The policy also requires that “[a]n

175.
176.
177.

178.

MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, PUBLIC SAFETY – EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION –
PROCEDURES, H.B. 1200, 434th Sess., at 3 (2014).
See supra Parts III–IV.
PUB. SAFETY § 3-506.1(b)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016). Specifically, “[b]efore an
identification procedure is conducted, an eyewitness shall be instructed, without
other eyewitnesses present, that the perpetrator may or may not be among the
persons in the identification procedure.” Id.
Id. § 3-506.1(b)(4). An “[i]dentification statement” is:
[A] documented statement that is sought by the administrator
when an identification is made: (i) from the eyewitness; (ii) in the
own words of the eyewitness, describing the eyewitness’s
confidence level that the person identified is the perpetrator of the
crime; (iii) given at the time of the viewing by the eyewitness
during the identification procedure; and (iv) given before the
eyewitness is given feedback.
Id. § 3-506.1(a)(9).
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identification procedure”179 must “be conducted by a blind or
blinded administrator.”180
The statue also requires the use of “fillers”181 and that “each filler
shall resemble the description of the perpetrator given by the
eyewitness in significant physical features, including any unique or
unusual features.”182 Further, if a witness has previously participated
in an identification procedure, “the fillers in the identification
procedure shall be different from the fillers used in any prior
identification procedure.”183 If there are multiple eyewitnesses, the
statute requires that each identification procedure be conducted
separately for each eyewitness;184 that the suspect be placed in a
different position for each separate identification procedure;185 and
that the eyewitnesses may not communicate with each other until all
the procedures have been completed.186

179.

180.

181.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

The statute defines an “[i]dentification procedure” as:
[A] “procedure in which a live lineup is conducted or an array of
photographs, including a photograph of a suspect and additional
photographs of other persons not suspected of the offense, is
displayed to an eyewitness in hard copy form or by computer for
the purpose of determining whether the eyewitness identifies the
suspect as the perpetrator.
Id. § 3-506.1(a)(8).
Id. § 3-506.1(b)(1). For purposes of the statute, “‘[b]lind’ means the administrator
does not know the identity of the suspect” and “‘blinded’ means the administrator
may know who the suspect is but does not know which lineup member is being
viewed by the eyewitness.” Id. §§ 3-506.1(a)(3)–(4). The statute also provides that
“[a]n administrator may be blinded through the use of: (i) an automated computer
program that prevents the administrator from seeing which photos the eyewitness is
viewing until after the identification procedure is completed; or: (ii) the folder
shuffle method.” Id. §§ 3-506.1(b)(2)(i)–(ii). The “folder shuffle method,” which
must also comply with the other components of the statute, is “a system for
conducting a photo lineup that . . . is conducted by placing photographs in folders,
randomly numbering the folders, shuffling the folders, and then presenting the
folders sequentially so that the administrator cannot see or track which photograph is
being presented to the eyewitness until after the procedure is completed.” Id. § 3506.1(a)(7)(ii).
A “[f]iller” is “a person or a photograph who is not suspected of an offense and is
included in an identification procedure.” Id. § 3-506.1(a)(6). The statute requires
that “at least five fillers, in addition to the suspect, shall be included when an array
of photographs is displayed to an eyewitness” and that “at least four fillers, in
addition to the suspect, shall be included in a live lineup.” Id. § 3-506.1(c)(2)–(3).
Id. § 3-506.1(c)(1).
Id. § 3-506.1(d).
Id. § 3-506.1(e)(1).
Id. § 3-506.1(e)(2).
Id. § 3-506.1(e)(3).
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Finally, the statute requires written documentation of the
identification procedure,187 including: (1) all identification and nonidentification results obtained during the procedure;188 (2) the signed
identification statement of the eyewitness;189 (3) the names of all
persons present at the procedure;190 (4) the date and time of the
procedure;191 (5) whether the witness identified a “filler”;192 and (6)
all photographs used in the procedure.193 Police are excused from
documenting these details in writing if a video or audio recording of
the procedure captures all of the requisite information.194
The model policy of the Maryland Police Training Commission is
essentially congruent.195 The policy requires blind administration196
and encourages officers to “make an effort to prevent eyewitnesses
from comparing their recollections of the offender or the incident”
by “promptly separating the witnesses and interviewing each out of
the earshot of the others.”197 Like the statutory policy, the model
policy commands that “[w]itnesses should not participate in
identification procedures together.”198 The model policy, like the
statutory policy, requires written documentation of any identification
statement.199
187.
188.
189.

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. § 3-506.1(f)(1).
Id. § 3-506.1(f)(1)(i).
Id. § 3-506.1(f)(1)(ii). Recording the identification (and non-identification) results
of the procedure, as well as the identification statement of the eyewitness, is in
keeping with an approach that “treat[s] eyewitness memory just as carefully
as . . . other forms of trace evidence, like DNA, bloodstains, or fingerprints, the
evidentiary value of which can be impaired or destroyed by contamination.” See
State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 689 (Or. 2012). This approach recognizes “the
original memory as the sole source of evidentiary value in eyewitness
identifications,” and that “[l]ike those forms of evidence, once contaminated, a
witness’s original memory is very difficult to retrieve.” Id. The statute codifies this
approach and seeks to record the original identification in its original form and
preserve that memory like forensic or other evidence which could be corrupted or
contaminated.
PUB. SAFETY § 3-506.1(f)(1)(iii).
Id. § 3-506.1(f)(1)(iv).
Id. § 3-506.1(f)(1)(v).
Id. § 3-506.1(f)(1)(vi).
Id. § 3-506.1(f)(2).
Md. Police & Corr. Training Comm’ns, Eyewitness Identification, MDLE,
http://mdle.net/resources.htm (follow “Download Eyewitness ID Maryland”; then
follow “Policy and Forms”; and then follow “Eyewitness Identification Policy
(2012)”) (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Policy].
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (“If practicable, the officer should record the procedure and the witness’
statement of certainty. If not, the officer should write down the witness’ exact words
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Likewise, the model policy is very similar to the statutory policy
regarding the administration of a photographic identification
procedure. The policy states “[e]yewitnesses will be given specific
instructions prior to being shown a suspect”200 and has a specified set
of pre-identification instructions that are to be read prior to a showup, lineup, or photographic array procedure.201 The model policy
similarly requires at least five fillers in each photographic array202
and requires that they match the description of the offender,203 not
the suspect.204 The policy requires that the suspect’s photograph
should not stand out from the others.205 The policy also requires (1)
“changing the order of the photos” when the array is presented to
another witness,206 (2) that separate arrays must be used for each
witness,207 and (3) when showing an array containing a new suspect,
to avoid any fillers from the prior array.208
Officers are to record the identification procedure,209 “[a]llow each
witness to view the photographs independently out of the
presence . . . of the other witnesses,”210 and “[n]ever make
suggestive statements that may influence the judgment or perception

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

and incorporate them into his/her report. The witness should be asked to initial and
date the front of the photograph selected.”). The Policy also requires:
A report of every show-up, photo array, line-up or voice
identification procedure, whether an identification is made or not,
shall be submitted. The report shall include a summary of the
procedure, the persons who were present for it, instructions given
to the witness by the officer (this should be accomplished by
submitting the appropriate witness instruction form), any
statement or reaction by the witness, and any comments made by
the witness regarding the identification procedure.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Specifically, the policy encourages officer to “[a]void fillers who so closely
match the suspect that a person familiar with the suspect would have difficulty
distinguishing the filler.” Id.
Id. Additionally, officers are encouraged, “[w]ithout altering the photo of the
suspect,” to “create a consistent appearance between the suspect and the fillers with
respect to any unique or unusual feature such as facial scars or severe injuries by
adding or covering the feature.” Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (“The photo array should be preserved as evidence in the same configuration as
when the identification was made.”).
Id.
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of the witness.”211 The model policy also requires double-blind212 or
blinded administration of the photographic array,213 as well as
informing the witness of the fact that the procedure is being
conducted in a double-blind manner.214 Like the statutory policy, the
model policy requires an officer to record the witness’s degree of
confidence.215
There are some significant features in the model policy that are not
addressed by the statutory procedures. For example, the policy urges
officers to “use caution when interviewing eyewitnesses”216 and to
“avoid whenever possible the use of leading questions.”217 The
model policy, unlike the statutory policy, addresses “show-up”
identifications and notes that such procedures “should only be used
soon after a crime has been committed, typically within two hours or
under exigent circumstances, such as the near death of the only
available witness.”218
The policy states that “show-up”
identifications should be confined to emergency situations219 and
should be “as fair and non-suggestive as possible.”220

211.
212.

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

220.

Id.
Id. The policy states that “[a] second officer who is unaware of which photograph
depicts the suspect should actually show the photographs” and that this technique “is
intended to ensure that the witness does not interpret a gesture or facial expression
by the officer as an indication as to the identity of the suspect.” Id.
Id. The policy also iterates that “[i]f a second officer is not available, the officer
showing the array must employ a so-called “blinded’ technique so that he/she does
not know when the witness is viewing a photograph of the suspect.” Id.
Id. (“[O]fficers should explain to the witness that the officer showing the array does
not know the identity of the people in the photographs. The investigating officer
should leave the room while the array is being shown by the administrator.”).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The policy further notes that “[s]how-ups should be conducted live whenever
possible and not photographically.” Id.
Id. (“When a show-up is arranged in an emergency situation, where either a witness
or a victim is in imminent danger of death or in critical condition in a hospital, and
the circumstances are such that an immediate confrontation is imperative, the
emergency identification procedure shall be conducted in a non-suggestive
manner.”).
Id. (“Every show-up must be as fair and non-suggestive as possible. Specifically, if
the suspect is handcuffed, he/she should be positioned so that the handcuffs are not
visible to the witness. The suspect should not be viewed when he/she is inside a
police vehicle, in a cell, or in jail clothing.”). The policy further urges that “[p]olice
officers must not do or say anything that might convey to the witnesses that they
have evidence of the suspect’s guilt. Officers should turn down their radios so that
the witness they are transporting does not pick up information about the stop of the
suspect.” Id.
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With regard to the photographic identification procedure, the
model policy requires sequential administration of the
photographs.221 If the witness fails to make an identification when
first shown the array, “but asks to view the array a second time,” the
policy requires the administrator to “ask the witness if he/she was
able to make an identification from the original viewing.”222 Only if
the witness “feels that it would be helpful to repeat the procedure” is
it permissible to show the array a second time.223 An array may not
be shown to the witness more than twice.224
The model policy also has provisions on procedures outside the
scope of this article, including (1) voice identifications;225 (2)
courtroom identifications;226 (3) the use of composite sketches;227
and (4) the use of “mug files” or “mug books.”228
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF THE MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE
REFORMS TO EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
PROCEDURES
What is notably lacking from the statute—and what animates the
remainder of this article—is the lack of any enforcement mechanism.
Although some remedies were proposed in earlier versions of the
statute,229 the enacted statute has no enforcement mechanism or
sanction for non-compliance. This is significant because the
violation of a statute, standing alone, is not grounds for

221.

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. Specifically, “[t]he officer should show the photographs to a witness one at a
time. When the witness signals for the next photograph, the officer should move the
first photograph so that it is out of sight. This procedure should be repeated until the
witness has viewed each photograph.” Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The first reading of the statute provided that evidence of the failure to comply with
the statute was to be considered by a court in adjudicating a motion to suppress the
identification; that evidence of the failure to comply with the statute was admissible
to support a claim of eyewitness misidentification; and that if evidence of noncompliance was presented at trial, the “jury shall be instructed that the jury may
consider credible evidence of noncompliance in determining the reliability of an
eyewitness identification.” MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, PUBLIC SAFETY – EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION – PROCEDURES,
H.B.
1200,
434th
Sess.,
at
3
(2014). This provision was stricken from the statute by the Third Reading. MD.
GEN. ASSEMBLY, PUBLIC SAFETY – EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION – PROCEDURES, H.B.
1200, 434th Sess., at 3 (2014).
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suppression.230 Therefore, while the legislature has required a
significant number of procedures that have been shown to produce
more reliable eyewitness identifications, litigants must explore how
best to enforce, and respond to a violation of, the provisions of this
statute.
The remainder of this article explores the remedies and litigation
strategies that should be available to a criminal defendant who shows
that law enforcement officers failed to comply with the legislatively
required procedures for creating and administering an extrajudicial
identification procedure. Each remedy explored below is premised
upon proof of law enforcement non-compliance of the statute. Every
remedy suggested below is short of the remedy of total suppression,
which occurs if a defendant can show that the procedure violated the
federal due process protections against an unnecessarily suggestive
procedure which produced an unreliable identification.
Specifically, this article argues that current Maryland law should
permit a defendant who shows that law enforcement officers failed
to comply with the statutorily required procedures for an
extrajudicial identification: (1) to move in limine to exclude the
identification on evidentiary grounds. Current Maryland law should
also permit the defendant to: (2) cross-examine law enforcement
officers concerning the failure to employ the procedures required by
statute; (3) introduce expert testimony informing the jury why the
procedures required by statute should be employed and how the
failure to employ those procedures may affect the reliability of a
resulting identification; (4) request a jury instruction informing the
jury that certain procedures are required by law and that the jury may
consider the failure to employ those procedures in assessing the
weight to give to an identification; and (5) argue to the jury that the
230.

Maryland courts have been clear:
“One may not wish an exclusionary rule into being by waiving a
magic wand. It is something that must be deliberately and
explicitly created to cover a given type of violation.”
Accordingly, where the Legislature does not provide explicitly for
a suppression remedy, courts generally should not read one into
the statute.
King v. State, 76 A.3d 1035, 1047 (Md. 2013) (citation omitted) (quoting Sun Kin
Chan v. State, 552 A.2d 1351, 1363 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989)); Upshur v. State, 56
A.3d 620, 629 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (noting that a court “will not create a
suppression remedy . . . where the legislature did not create one at the time it enacted
the statute”). It therefore seems apparent that suppression of an identification is not
an available remedy if a law enforcement agency fails to adopt a policy in keeping
with the legislative mandate, or if an individual identification procedure fails to
comply with an extant or required policy.
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failure to employ the procedures required by statute render the
identification unreliable.
It must be noted that none of these remedies exist in a vacuum, and
none should be considered independently of the others. To the
contrary, there is a symbiotic relationship between several of these
remedies, and the exploration of one remedy may be necessary to the
provision of another. For example, cross-examination of a law
enforcement officer and the testimony of an expert witness may be
needed to establish the requisite factual basis for a jury instruction
and closing argument. A jury instruction may be necessary to lend
additional (and needed) gravitas to closing argument. These
proposed remedies should not be viewed as individual remedies
depending on the nature of the transgression; they should be viewed
as a package that works together in harmony.
This article does not suggest that the violation of the statute should
result in the total exclusion of the identification (except through an
evidentiary motion in limine). Rather, between total suppression and
leaving the defendant bereft of a way to respond to law enforcement
non-compliance, this article seeks “a middle temperature between
the two,” viz., specific and focused remedies that respond directly to
the failure to comply with the statute, evens the adversarial playing
field once law enforcement secures an identification in violation of
the statute, and ultimately, induces law enforcement fidelity to the
General Assembly’s legislative reforms to the area of extrajudicial
identification procedures.
A. Reasons for Providing Remedies for the Failure to Comply with
the Statutorily Mandated Procedures
The ultimate aim of this article is to ensure that the law
enforcement community adopts and utilizes the procedures required
in Maryland by statute. If an extrajudicial identification procedure
complies with the statute, this article is of no use and there is no need
for any remedy; if a defendant shows that police failed to adopt or
comply with a statutorily required procedure, this article advocates
for the provision of appropriate trial remedies. These remedies are
not to be seen as a windfall for the defendant or a technicality.
These remedies should be provided to ultimately induce the law
enforcement community to do what it should: comply with the
statute. It is the author’s most profound hope that law enforcement
will quickly cast this article into obsolescence.
The reasons why the law enforcement should be induced to
comply with the statute are manifest. The General Assembly has
mandated the use of certain procedures, rooted in the best present
scientific understandings of human memory, which increase the
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reliability of an eyewitness identification procedure. A more reliable
process produces a more accurate result. By ensuring compliance
with these mandated procedures, courts will ensure that only the
identifications which are the product of a more reliable process are
submitted to a jury. Thus, encouraging identifications that have a
greater measure of reliability and accuracy increases the overall
reliability of the identifications introduced in Maryland. This,
ultimately, increases the likelihood that the true culprit will be
identified and an innocent individual will not be wrongly identified.
There are many profound interests involved in endeavoring to
better secure correct identification of the guilty and avoid the
wrongful identification of the innocent. Two tragedies occur when a
person is wrongly convicted of a crime he or she did not commit.
The first is the obvious individual tragedy for the wrongly convicted
individual.231 There could be no greater miscarriage of justice than
to convict the wrong individual of a serious criminal offense and to
allow that person to be punished in the true culprit’s stead.
There is also a profound public interest in preventing wrongful
convictions. When a person is wrongly convicted of a crime, the
true culprit remains free to reoffend. There is a profound and
compelling public interest—which should be sought equally by the
defense, the prosecution, the judiciary, and society at large—in
ensuring that the real culprit is swiftly brought to justice. In his
231.

Maryland is not immune to the tragic phenomena of wrongful conviction. Indeed,
two leading Maryland cases on eyewitness identification issues involved the
erroneous identification of a person who was later exonerated. As noted, one of the
earliest and most influential Maryland cases adopting the federal due process
approach regarding suppression of extrajudicial identifications was Webster v. State,
474 A.2d 1305, 1318 (Md. 1984). Bernard Webster, however, was innocent of that
crime; he was identified by a rape victim as her assailant; her identification was
admitted under the present standard; and he was incarcerated for over twenty years
for a crime he did not commit. See, e.g., Stephanie Hanes, DNA’s Secrets Set a Man
Free, BALT. SUN (Mar. 9, 2003), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/balwebster030903-story.html; Bernard Webster, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/bernard-webster/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
In Bloodsworth v. State, 512 A.2d 1056 (Md. 1986), which was decided two years
later, the Maryland Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the jury should be
allowed to hear expert testimony concerning eyewitness memory, recall, and
identification. Bloodsworth was convicted of sexual offenses and murder and
sentenced to death based on multiple eyewitness identifications. Id. at 1057, 1065.
He was exonerated in 1993 based on DNA testing and became the first person in our
country to be sentenced to death and proven innocent through DNA testing. See
Bomas v. State, 987 A.2d 98, 109–10 (Md. 2010); Kirk Bloodsworth, INNOCENCE
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/kirk-bloodsworth/ (last visited Apr.
1, 2017).
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landmark study of the first 250 DNA exonerations, Professor Garrett
notes that “[i]n 45% of the 250 postconviction DNA exonerations
(112 cases), the test results identified the culprit. This most often
occurred through a ‘cold hit’ or a match in growing law enforcement
DNA data banks.”232 More importantly:
Some of these culprits subsequently confessed or pleaded
guilty. At least forty of these perpetrators have been
convicted of crimes that they committed while innocent
persons were behind bars. They were convicted of
approximately fifty-six rapes and nineteen murders after
innocent people were convicted of their earlier crimes. The
perpetrators may have committed many more crimes, but
were not caught or were not successfully prosecuted. The
DNA testing that eventually was done probably prevented
still more crimes. As with [one exoneree], had it not been
for the postconviction DNA testing, these people could have
continued their crime spree with impunity. Those cases all
highlight how important it is for public safety to make sure
that the right person is convicted. Wrongful convictions are
a serious law enforcement problem.233
Likewise, another commentator has noted:
The individual and social harms spawned by wrongful
convictions are undeniable, compound, and severe. The
new crimes committed by offenders who have cheated
justice, and the brutal devastation of the lives of additional
rounds of victims, are paramount among those harms.
Everyone loses when criminal justice miscarries; everyone,
that is, except the murderers, rapists, burglars, robbers, and
other lawbreakers who remain at liberty, often to reoffend,
while the innocent are punished in their stead.234
Again, the Maryland experience has shown that this is a palpable
concern.235
232.
233.
234.
235.

GARRETT, supra note 82, at 5.
Id. at 232 (footnote omitted).
James R. Acker, The Flipside Injustice of Wrongful Convictions: When the Guilty
Go Free, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1629, 1709 (2012).
For example, Kirk Bloodsworth was not fully exonerated until DNA testing later
identified the person who committed the murder and sexual assault for which
Bloodsworth had been convicted twice; that man pled guilty to the offenses. See
Stephanie Hanes, Guilty Plea Closes ‘84 Case of Rosedale Girl’s Murder, BALT.
SUN (May 21, 2004), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2004-05-
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A wrongful conviction is anathema to our system of justice and,
more importantly, when an innocent person is incorrectly identified
as the criminal actor the true culprit is left free to reoffend. By
encouraging the law enforcement community to adopt procedures
that increase the reliability and accuracy of extrajudicial
identification procedures and ensuring that identifications with
increased reliability are presented to the jury, our system can best
promote avoiding an individual wrongful conviction and the
profound societal effect of permitting the true culprit to remain free.
B. Proposed Remedies for the Failure to Utilize Statutorily
Required Procedures for Extrajudicial Identification Procedures
1. Motion in Limine to Exclude Identification
In Perry, the Supreme Court refused to modify its extant due
process check on the admissibility of extrajudicial identification
procedures, noting “other safeguards built into our adversary system
that caution juries against placing undue weight on eyewitness
testimony of questionable reliability.”236 One of the safeguards
noted by the Court was for litigants to rely upon traditional rules of
evidence, which “permit trial judges to exclude relevant evidence if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
impact or potential for misleading the jury.”237
This approach was adopted in Oregon in State v. Lawson. In
Lawson, the Oregon Supreme Court noted the “estimator” and
“system” variables identified in the scientific literature pertaining to
eyewitness memory and identification.238 The court placed the onus

236.
237.
238.

21/news/0405210277_1_ruffner-dawn-hamilton-bloodsworth; Susan Levine, ExDeath Row Inmate Hears Hoped-for Words: We Found
Killer, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2003),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/09/06/ex-death-row-inmatehears-hoped-for-words-we-found-killer/830ae600-0599-4e7a-a51bd461885be769/?utm_term=.f66e19c33432. The culprit was identified after DNA
from this offense was matched to his in a database of offenders. The true culprit had
been convicted of attempting to rape a woman at knifepoint, which was after the
offense for which Bloodsworth had been wrongly convicted. See Stephanie Hanes,
’84 Investigation Quick to Overlook the Culprit, BALT. SUN (May 22, 2004),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2004-05-22/news/0405220166_1_ruffner-dawnhamilton-bloodsworth.
Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 245 (2012).
Id. at 247.
See State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 686–88 (Or. 2012) (providing an overview of
system and estimator variables). The Lawson court identifies “system variables” as:
(1) blind administration; (2) pre-identification instructions; (3) lineup construction;
(4) simultaneous versus sequential lineups; (5) show-ups; (6) multiple viewings; (7)
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on the proponent of the identification239—inevitably the prosecution
—to make a prima facie showing of “evidence showing both that the
witness had an adequate opportunity to observe or otherwise
personally perceive the facts to which the witness will testify, and
did, in fact, observe or perceive them, thereby gaining personal
knowledge of the facts.”240 The court ultimately considered an
identification to be a lay opinion (viz., “that a defendant on trial is
the same person that the witness saw at the scene”241) and
emphasized that, like any opinion offered into evidence, it must have
a sufficient factual basis.242 Under the Lawson approach, “[h]uman
facial features will ordinarily be sufficiently distinctive to serve as a
rational basis for an inference of identification,” but “nonfacial
features like race, height, weight, clothing, or hair color, generally
lack the level of distinction necessary to permit the witness to
identify a specific person as the person whom the witness saw.”243
The court also acknowledged that when the witness’s personal
knowledge is derived from an impermissible source, such as a
suggestive police procedure, the proponent of the identification must
show that the identification is based upon a permissible source (i.e.,
the witness’s observations at the scene), rather than the
impermissible source of knowledge.244 Finally, the proponent must
establish that the identification is helpful.245

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

suggestive questioning, co-witness contamination, and other sources of memory
contamination; and (8) suggestive feedback and recording confidence. Id. at 686–
87. The court also identifies “estimator variables” as: (1) stress; (2) witness
attention; (3) duration of exposure; (4) environmental viewing conditions; (5)
witness characteristics and condition; (6) description; (7) perpetrator characteristics;
(8) speed of identification; (9) level of certainty; and (10) memory decay. Id. at
687–88.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 692.
Id.
See id. at 693 (requiring a reviewing court to “initially consider what the witness
actually perceived . . . and then determine whether the witness’s identification of the
defendant was ‘rationally based’ on those perceptions”).
Id.
Id.
Id. The court “anticipate[d] that that burden will be easily satisfied in nearly all
cases,” but noted at least a hypothetical example of when the opinion might not help
the jury in its task. Id. at 693–94 (“Consider, for example, the witness who observes
a masked perpetrator with prominently scarred or tattooed hands. Although those
features could be distinctive enough to provide a rational basis for an inference of
identification, a jury may be equally capable of making the same inference by
comparing the witness’s description of those markings to objective evidence of the
actual markings on the defendant. In such cases, the witness’s opinion that
defendant is the perpetrator provides the jury with little, if any, additional useful
information.”).
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Once the proponent shows that the identification is based upon a
sufficient and permissible factual basis, the Lawson approach
requires a court to review the probity of the identification against its
relative dangers. In the first step of the analysis, the court observed
that “[t]he persuasive force of eyewitness identification testimony is
directly linked to its reliability. . . . Conversely, the less reliable a
witness’s testimony, the less persuasive it will be.”246 This approach
requires a court to “examine the relative reliability of evidence
produced by the parties to determine the probative value of the
identification,” recognizing that “[t]he more factors—the presence of
system variables alone or in combination with estimator variables—
that weigh against reliability of the identification, the less persuasive
the identification evidence will be to prove the fact of identification,
and correspondingly, the less probative value that identification will
have.”247 In this initial step, all the proponent must show is that the
identification has probative value, and the court recognized there is a
wide range of probity and “many identifications possessing
relatively low probative value may still pass that initial test.”248
Once a reviewing court assesses the probity of the identification,
“[it] must then determine whether the evidence might unfairly
prejudice the defendant.”249 The court should be cognizant that “in
cases in which an eyewitness has been exposed to suggestive police
procedures, trial courts have a heightened role as an evidentiary
gatekeeper because ‘traditional’ methods of testing reliability—like
cross-examination—can be ineffective at discrediting unreliable or
inaccurate eyewitness identification evidence.”250 The court may
exclude the identification in toto and may also “exclude particularly
prejudicial aspects of a witness’s testimony without excluding the
identification itself” or exclude certain prejudicial aspects of the
testimony without excluding the testimony completely.251
Oregon seems to be the only jurisdiction that has utilized state law
to fashion a test for excluding an identification on evidentiary
grounds. Maryland practitioners should, therefore, know they sail
uncharted waters in filing a motion in limine to exclude an
eyewitness identification under the Lawson approach.
In
undertaking this voyage, however, practitioners should note the
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 694.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 695.
Id.
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similarities between Maryland and Oregon evidentiary principles.
Maryland, like Oregon, requires a showing that the witness’s
testimony is based on personal knowledge252 and requires a showing
that there is a sufficient factual basis for any opinion testimony.253
Lawson ultimately rests upon an assessment of the relative probative
value of the identification weighed against the potential prejudice in
admitting the testimony. In this evaluation, the same rules that
allowed the Lawson court to undertake this analysis are identical to
the Maryland Rules that guide a Maryland court in undertaking an
analysis of whether the identification should be admitted into
evidence.254
252.
253.

254.

See MD. RULE 5-602 (noting “a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of
the matter”).
In Maryland, the proponent of opinion testimony must demonstrate a sufficient
factual basis for the opinion. Without a factual basis, the opinion is nothing more
than inadmissible conjecture and speculation. Uhlik v. Kopec, 314 A.2d 732, 737
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974). This issue usually arises with regard to expert opinions,
and in that regard,“[a]n expert’s judgment has no probative force unless there is a
sufficient basis upon which to support his [or her] conclusions.” Worthington
Constr. Corp. v. Moore, 291 A.2d 466, 470–71 (Md. 1972); Surkovich v. Doub, 265
A.2d 447, 451 (Md. 1970) (noting “an expert’s opinion is of no greater probative
value than the soundness of his reasons given therefore will warrant”); see also State
Health Dep’t v. Walker, 209 A.2d 555, 559 (Md. 1965) (explaining how the record
“must disclose that the expert is sufficiently familiar with the subject matter under
investigation to elevate his opinion above the realm of conjecture and speculation,
for no matter how highly qualified the expert may be in his field, his opinion has no
probative force unless a sufficient factual basis to support a rational conclusion is
shown”); 6 LYNN MCCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 705.1 (2015) (requiring “the
opinion [to] ha[ve] a sufficient basis for it to be considered by the fact-finder”).
The definition of relevance which guides the court’s assessment of probity is the
same in Oregon and Maryland. Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 40.150 (2015)
(“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.”), with MD. RULE 5-401
(“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.”). Once the court determines
the probative value of the identification, the assessment of probity versus prejudice is
likewise identical in both states (except that, in Maryland, evidence may be excluded
if it is a “waste of time”). Compare OR. R. EVID. 403 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. §
40.160 (2015)) (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.”), with MD. RULE 5-403 (“Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.”).
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Thus, Maryland law would seem to support filing a motion in
limine, raising the arguments identified in Lawson, to exclude an
identification on evidentiary grounds. Indeed, this appears to be the
best way to engraft “system” and “estimator” variables into
Maryland law. Under this approach, the focus is not on the
suggestiveness, but on the overall reliability of the procedure and
resulting identification. Counsel should note that, of all the remedies
suggested in this article, this approach has the least likelihood of
success, mostly because (to the author’s knowledge) this approach
has never been tried in Maryland. Nevertheless, should an
identification raise legitimate concerns as to its reliability, and
present pertinent system and estimator variables, counsel should
endeavor to have the identification excluded on evidentiary grounds.
2. Cross-Examination of the Law Enforcement Officers Who
Created and Administered the Procedure.
The most immediate form of defense is to permit crossexamination of law enforcement officers concerning the failure to
comply with the legislatively mandated procedures for conducting an
extrajudicial identification procedure. The defendant should also be
allowed to examine the officers who created and administered the
extrajudicial identification procedure to establish a necessary factual
basis for the other remedies suggested by this article.
In Maryland, unless it is otherwise excluded, “all relevant evidence
is admissible.”255 Relevant evidence is “any evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.”256 The fact that a person identified
the defendant in an extrajudicial identification procedure is evidence
that the person is the person who committed the offense. If police
failed to utilize more reliable procedures that produce more reliable
identifications, the resulting identification is—or, could be found by
the jury to be—less reliable. This, therefore, makes the failure to
utilize the statutory procedures relevant because it affects the relative
weight the jury should afford to an identification that was procured
in an extrajudicial identification procedure that did not comply with
the statutory requirements. Given that this evidence would impact
the relative weight of the State’s case, vis-à-vis criminal agency, it is
a proper area to explore in cross-examination.
255.
256.

MD. RULE 5-402.
MD. RULE 5-401.
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The practitioner should note that this should be an area of
exploration in cross-examining a law enforcement officer who
conducted an extrajudicial identification procedure because several
other remedies, such as jury instructions and argument, require a
factual basis, and this is likely the best area to obtain the facts
necessary for an argument or instruction. Proper cross-examination
should go towards showing that the officer did not comply with
relevant and specific aspects of the statutory requirements.257
Counsel should also inquire as to whether the officer’s agency has a
written policy concerning extrajudicial identification procedures,
whether the terms of that policy comply with the statutory mandates
and, if so, why the officer did not comply with that policy.258
3. Expert Testimony Concerning the Relative Reliability of the
Identification
In Perry, the Supreme Court refused to depart from the present due
process check upon eyewitness identification testimony, noting that
jurors may be educated concerning the reliability of those
identifications via expert testimony “on the hazards of eyewitness
identification evidence.”259 While expert testimony on eyewitness
memory and identification is now admissible in most jurisdictions—
including Maryland—the need for such testimony in a Maryland trial
is even stronger, given that an expert may educate the jury as to: (a)
why the legislature would require certain procedures in the
composition and administration of an extrajudicial identification
procedure; and (b) how the failure to utilize those procedures in a
257.

258.

259.

For example, the statute requires an identification procedure to be conducted by a
“blind” or “blinded” administrator, (i.e., an administrator who “does not know the
identity of the suspect” or an administrator who “may know who the suspect is but
does not know which lineup member is being viewed by the eyewitness”). MD.
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 3-506.1(a)(3)–(4), (b)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016). A
relevant line of inquiry would be: “Officer, when you administered the photographic
array, you knew that Mr. Defendant was the suspect, correct? And you knew that he
was in position four in the array, correct?”
Admittedly, the latter lines of questioning may be less relevant than questioning
establishing compliance vel non with the statutorily required procedures. However,
at some point, the jury will need to know the relative importance of the failure to
undertake certain procedures, such as blind or blinded administration of the array.
The importance, of course, is that law enforcement agencies are required by statute
to adopt these procedures because they produce more reliable identifications.
Adequately informing the jury of these requirements and their importance—via a
jury instruction or in some other meaningful way—may obviate the need for these
questions in cross-examination, as long as the jury is ultimately informed that
Maryland law requires law enforcement agencies to adopt, and employ, these
required procedures.
Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 247 (2012).
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particular array affects the relative reliability of the resulting
identification. Where law enforcement agencies or individual
officers fail to comply with the legislatively required procedures, a
defendant should be allowed to adduce expert testimony informing
the jury how the failure to comply with those policies affects the
weight of the identification.
In Bomas v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals “recognize[d]
that scientific advances . . . may assist juries in evaluating
eyewitness testimony” and “appreciate[d] that scientific advances
have revealed (and may continue to reveal) a novel or greater
understanding of the mechanics of memory that may not be intuitive
to a layperson.”260 The Court also “ma[d]e clear that trial courts
should recognize these scientific advances in exercising their
discretion whether to admit such expert testimony in a particular
case.”261 In so doing, the Court embraced “a flexible standard that
can properly gauge the state of the scientific art in relation to the
specific facts of the case.”262 Ultimately, the Court reiterated that the
proper test for the admissibility of expert testimony is the
discretionary consideration of “whether [the expert’s] testimony will
be of real appreciable help to the trier of fact in deciding the issue

260.

261.

262.

987 A.2d 98, 112 (Md. 2010). The Court also noted that Bloodsworth v. State, 512
A.2d 1056 (Md. 1986)—its only prior consideration of the propriety of expert
testimony on eyewitness memory and identification—“strikes a negative tone with
respect to expert testimony on eyewitness identification.” Id. at 108. In
Bloodsworth, the Maryland Court of Appeals had noted that, as of that time, “[t]he
vast majority of courts have rejected” expert testimony on eyewitness identification,
512 A.2d at 1064, and emphasized “[o]ur legal system places primary reliance for
the ascertainments of truth on the test of cross-examination,” and “[i]t is the
responsibility of counsel during cross-examination to inquire into whether the
witness’ opportunity for observation, his capacity for observation, his attention and
interest and his distraction or division of attention.” Id. at 1065 (quoting United
States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973)). The Bloodsworth Court also
noted such testimony “would effectively invade the province of the jury” and “open
a floodgate whereby experts would testify on every conceivable aspect of a witness’
credibility.” Id. (quoting State v. Porraro, 404 A.2d 465, 471 (R.I. 1979)). While
the Bomas Court did not change the test for the admissibility of such testimony, it
retracted the Court’s prior negative attitude towards the admission of this testimony.
Bomas, 987 A.2d at 112. The Court also noted the prevalence of wrongful
convictions based on incorrect eyewitness identification, id. at 109, and that it was
“sensitive to the perils of such testimony” and concluded by “reiterat[ing] that trial
courts, in considering the admission of expert testimony regarding eyewitness
observation and memory, should recognize scientific advances that have led to a
greater understanding of the mechanics of memory that may not be intuitive to a
layperson.” Id. at 116.
Id. at 112.
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presented.”263 While noting that other remedies may be available to
the defendant,264 the Court iterated that “the probative value of
expert testimony on eyewitness identification and how much such
testimony can actually help the jury in the case before it must be
carefully weighed by the court on a case-by-case basis.”265
The Court also observed that “[a] trial judge must have the ability
to determine whether proffered testimony has a credible foundation
and is relevant to the facts of a given case”266 and must evaluate
whether the proffered expert testimony is relevant to the case at
hand.267 In Bomas, the Court ultimately affirmed the exclusion of
expert testimony, which was general, vague, and lacked a sufficient
factual basis.268
Consistent with Bomas’ “flexible standard that can properly gauge
the state of the scientific art in relation to the specific facts of the
case,”269 when the defendant shows that law enforcement officers
who administered an extrajudicial identification procedure failed to
comply with a certain component of the statutorily required
procedures, the defendant should be permitted to adduce expert
testimony educating the jury as to how that particular procedure
increases the reliability of an identification, and thus, how the failure
to employ that required procedure affects the identification at hand.
For example, if a defendant shows that the officer who administered
the procedure was neither blind nor blinded, the defendant should be
able to introduce the testimony of an expert who can educate jurors
as to why a procedure should be conducted in a blind or blinded
manner and the impact that non-blinded administration has upon the
ultimate reliability of the identification.
The use of expert testimony in this arena may ultimately
synthesize several pertinent considerations.
Maryland law
recognizes the scientific advances concerning eyewitness memory
263.
264.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 106 (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth, 512 A.2d at 1066).
The Court noted that “[e]xpert testimony is not the only means to educate juries
about the vagaries of eyewitness testimonies and safeguard against wrongful
convictions based on misidentifications.” Id. The Court observed “other trial
components such as cross-examination, closing arguments, and jury instructions, can
provide the jury with sufficient information to evaluate the reliability of eyewitness
identifications.” Id. To this end, the Court iterated that it may be appropriate for the
Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction Committee “to evaluate whether its
current rule on witnesses . . . should be modified in light of the studies about
eyewitness testimony, and the scientific advances in this area.” Id.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 112–13.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 112.
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and identification in the past several decades and supports the
admission of expert testimony on that topic, provided that the
testimony is helpful to the jury and pertinent to the facts at hand.270
The Maryland General Assembly, based upon that increased
scientific understanding, has required a series of procedures that will
help produce more reliable extrajudicial identifications.271 When the
defendant shows that law enforcement failed to comply with those
required procedures, an expert can provide the necessary
understanding as to why those procedures are required and why the
failure to employ those procedures impacts the weight the jury
should give to the resulting identification. This approach will thus
bring harmony between the admission of expert testimony
concerning a relevant aspect of the identification at issue and the
General Assembly’s requirement of specific procedures in creating
and administering an extrajudicial identification procedure.
Additionally, the testimony of an expert may provide the necessary
factual basis for a jury instruction concerning the required
procedures and the weight the jury should give to an identification
where the procedure does not comply with those procedures, as well
as any closing argument to that effect. Again, should law
enforcement comply with the statutorily required procedures and
employ these more reliable methods for creating and administering
extrajudicial identification procedures, expert testimony on the need
for such procedures would be unwarranted and not helpful to the
jury. Conversely, should law enforcement officers fail to employ
those procedures, expert testimony is an excellent way to educate
jurors as to the importance of those procedures in assessing the
evidence in the case. Thus, if law enforcement fails to comply with
the statutorily mandated procedures, a defendant should be permitted
to introduce expert testimony concerning the need for the procedures
that law enforcement did not employ and the weight to afford to a
non-compliant identification.
4. Jury Instructions
In Perry, the Supreme Court noted that unreliable identifications
may be countered by the “existing safeguards” in the trial process,
including jury instructions that “warn the jury to take care in

270.
271.

Id. at 112, 116.
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 3-506.1(b)–(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016).
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appraising identification evidence.”272 The Maryland Court of
Appeals has likewise noted that it may be appropriate for the
Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction Committee “to evaluate
whether its current rule on witnesses . . . should be modified in light
of the studies about eyewitness testimony, and the scientific
advances in this area.”273 Several states have recently adopted
pattern jury instructions reflecting present scientific understandings
of memory and identification,274 or tasked various committees with
adopting pattern jury instructions on that topic.275 Indeed, jury
instructions appear to be one of the core areas of eyewitness reform,
and commentators have argued that comprehensive jury instructions
on the science of eyewitness memory and identification may be the
“most effective” way to educate jurors as to the dangers of
eyewitness testimony.276
The need for, and efficacy of, pattern instructions on general issues
concerning eyewitness memory and identification is outside the
scope of this article. This article concerns potential defenses that can
be asserted once a criminal defendant shows that he or she was
identified in an extrajudicial identification procedure that did not
comply with the procedures required by statute. Should the
defendant show that law enforcement officers failed to comply with
the statute, the defendant should be entitled to a focused instruction
informing jurors as to what procedures are required by Maryland law
and that the failure to comply with the statute may be considered in
evaluating the weight of the resulting identification.
In Maryland, a jury instruction is appropriate if: it is a correct
statement of the law; it is applicable to the facts of the case; and it
relates to content not “fairly covered” elsewhere in the
instructions.277 While a trial judge has discretion in formulating an
appropriate instruction and in deciding whether to give an
instruction, the Court of Appeals will reverse the trial court’s

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 246 (2012) (citing United States v. Telfaire,
469 F.2d 552, 558–59 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam)).
Bomas, 987 A.2d at 113.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 918 (Mass. 2015).
See, e.g., Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 427 (Alaska 2016); State v. Cabagbag, 277
P.3d 1027, 1039 (Haw. 2012).
See Derek Simmonsen, Teach Your Jurors Well: Using Jury Instructions to Educate
Jurors About Factors Affecting the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony, 70 MD. L.
REV. 1044, 1047 (2011).
See Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 189–90 (Md. 2010); Dickey v. State, 946 A.2d 444,
450 (Md. 2008) (quoting MD. RULE 4-325).
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decision not to propound an instruction if it finds that the defendant’s
rights were not adequately protected.278
Maryland appellate courts have, on several occasions, indicated
that instructions on eyewitness identification issues may be
appropriate.
In Gunning v. State,279 which considered two
consolidated cases that had been tried separately before the same
judge, counsel for each defendant requested the court to propound
the pattern instruction concerning eyewitness identification, and in
both trials, the judge refused to propound the requested
instruction.280 The Maryland Court of Appeals held that a court has
discretion to consider whether to propound an instruction on
eyewitness testimony,281 and in exercising this discretion, the court
should analyze whether the evidence at trial gives rise to a need for
such an instruction by considering “such factors as any equivocation
associated with the identification, the extent to which mistaken
identification is reasonably at issue and the existence of, or lack of
corroboration of the eyewitness identification.”282 The Court also
rejected the contention that an instruction on the manner in which the
jury should evaluate an eyewitness identification went beyond the
court’s duty to instruct the jury as to the law and that it did not
constitute an impermissible comment upon the evidence.283 Finally,
the Court indicated that an instruction on eyewitness testimony
might assist the jury in its task by “pointing out the specific factors
that may affect eyewitness identification,” which might not be
generally known by jurors.284 Thus, the Court required a trial court
to give “careful consideration” to a request for a jury instruction on
eyewitness testimony when uncorroborated eyewitness testimony
was a critical aspect of the State’s case.285
In Janey v. State, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
reaffirmed this discretionary approach in considering whether the
trial court erred in failing to propound an instruction concerning
cross-racial identification.286
After reviewing Gunning and
discussing existing law, which stated that a trial court need not

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

See Cost, 10 A.3d at 189 (citing General v. State, 789 A.2d 102, 111 (Md. 2002)).
Gunning v. State, 701 A.2d 374 (Md. 1997).
Id. at 375–77.
Id. at 380–81.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 384–85.
891 A.2d 355, 356 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006).
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instruct the jury on factual (versus legal) inferences,287 the court
concluded “[i]t is clear . . . that an instruction that cautions the jury
about pertinent factors that can affect the reliability of eyewitness
identifications in general may be appropriate.”288 The court
ultimately held that there was no reversible error in refusing to
propound the instruction in that case because, under the facts of the
case, the requested instruction would not have significantly
influenced the outcome of the case.289 However, the court indicated
that it did not intend to foreclose such an instruction in a more
appropriate case.290
Outside of the eyewitness arena, Maryland law holds that it is
sometimes appropriate to instruct the jury as to factual inferences
that may arise from law enforcement missteps in the investigation of
a case. For example, in Cost v. State, the defendant was accused of
assaulting another inmate at a correctional institution and, at trial,
established that although the scene of the attack had initially been
preserved, the contents of the cell in question had been destroyed
before the scene could be appropriately investigated.291 The
defendant requested that the jury be instructed that the destruction of
this evidence could lead to an inference that the evidence was
favorable to the defendant.292 The Court ultimately agreed, noting
that the case presented an unusual circumstance in which “[t]he
evidence destroyed while in State custody was highly relevant to
[the] case,” and that evidence went “to the heart of the case.”293 In
those circumstances, the Court iterated that an instruction “which
would permit but not demand that the jury draw an inference that the
missing evidence would be unfavorable to the State, should have
been given.”294 The Court also noted that, although Cost could have
argued for the jury to draw the same inference, an instruction was
warranted because “argument by counsel to the jury will naturally be
imbued with a greater gravitas when it is supported by a[n]
instruction on the same point issued from the bench.”295 Last, the

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See id. at 361–62 (discussing Patterson v. State, 741 A.2d 1119, 1124–25 (Md.
1999)).
Id. at 362.
Id. at 367–68.
Id.
10 A.3d 184, 187–88 (Md. 2010).
Id. at 188.
Id. at 196.
Id.
Id. The Court further iterated, “As we have previously said, ‘a statement or
instruction by the trial judge carries with it the imprimatur of a judge learned in the
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Court observed that “[f]or the judicial system to function fairly, one
party in a case cannot be permitted to gain an unfair advantage
through destruction of evidence,” and thus, a jury instruction on the
jury’s ability to draw an inference would “help ensure that the
interests of justice are protected.”296
Cost involved the situation where an instruction was necessary to
level the playing field and preclude one party from gaining a
litigation advantage by destroying relevant evidence. Conversely, the
Maryland Court of Appeals has held that there is generally no
obligation to instruct the jury as to the situations in which law
enforcement has no duty to undertake certain actions during a
criminal investigation. In a series of cases addressing the so-called
“CSI-effect,”297 the Court of Appeals has cautioned judges to tread
carefully in propounding jury instructions concerning the absence of
a legal duty of police to undertake certain steps in investigating a
criminal case. In Atkins v. State,298 the Court held that a trial judge
abused her discretion in instructing a jury that “there is no legal
requirement that the State utilize any specific investigative technique
or scientific test to prove its case”299 because this instruction
“resulted in a non-neutral commentary on the evidence, or the
absence of evidence, actually admitted, and invaded the province of
the jury, thus violating Atkins’s constitutional rights to due process
and a fair trial.”300 In Stabb v. State,301 the Court again held that such
an instruction was improper and indicated that such instructions
should only be given when “it responds to correction of a pre-existing
overreaching by the defense, i.e., a curative instruction.”302 A
criminal defendant does not generate such a curative instruction when
he or she argues that the State has failed to employ “a well-known,
readily available, and superior method of proof,” such as fingerprint

296.
297.

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

law, and therefore usually has more force and effect than if merely presented by
counsel.’” Id. at 196–97 (quoting Hardison v. State, 172 A.2d 407, 411 (Md. 1961)).
Id. at 197.
See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 84 A.3d 69, 80 (Md. 2014) (expressing an “avowed
skepticism regarding the appropriate use of an ‘anti-CSI effect’ instruction”); Stabb
v. State, 31 A.3d 922, 930 (Md. 2011) (“The ‘CSI effect’ refers generally to various
theories that assert that exposure to courtroom or criminal investigative fictional
media may influence jurors’ objective evaluation of an actual trial.”).
Atkins v. State, 26 A.3d 979 (Md. 2011).
Id. at 983.
Id. at 980.
Stabb, 31 A.3d at 922.
Id. at 933.
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analysis, to connect the defendant to the crime.303 Thus, Maryland
law does not allow the court to instruct jurors as to what law
enforcement officers are not required to do, absent an improper
defense insinuation that law enforcement failed to perform a requisite
element of the investigation.
Maryland law also recognizes there is no duty for a judge to
instruct a jury on an “evidentiary inference” that “is not based on a
legal standard but on individual facts from which inferences can be
drawn.”304 While there is no requirement for the court to instruct the
jury on basic evidentiary inferences, there are myriad instances in
which the jury is instructed as to the requirements of Maryland law
and permitted to let specific legal considerations conveyed in the
instruction guide their fact-finding. For example, Maryland is one of
a few remaining jurisdictions that permits a person to resist an
unlawful warrantless arrest.305 Where the defendant is charged with
resisting arrest and the evidence in a case generates a factual issue as
to whether police had probable cause to arrest that person, the court
must propound an instruction concerning the right to resist the arrest
or, at minimum, concerning the legal requirements for a lawful
arrest.306 There are numerous instances in which a jury may be
instructed on issues as diverse as whether the defendant’s destruction
of evidence307 or bribery of a witness308 shows a consciousness of
guilt. In Maryland, a jury is permitted to decide whether a
defendant’s statement to police is voluntary and is instructed to
303.
304.
305.

306.

307.
308.

Robinson v. State, 84 A.3d 69, 81 (Md. 2014); see, e.g., Sample v. State, 550 A.2d
661, 663 (Md. 1988); Eley v. State, 419 A.2d 384, 386–87 (Md. 1980); see infra
note 330 and accompanying text.
Patterson v. State, 741 A.2d 1119, 1123 (Md. 1999).
Maryland has long recognized “that one illegally arrested may use any reasonable
means to effect his escape, even to the extent of using such force as is reasonably
necessary.” Sugarman v. State, 195 A. 324, 326 (Md. 1937); see also State v.
Wiegmann, 714 A.2d 841, 851 (Md. 1998) (declining “to abolish the long-standing
common law privilege permitting persons to resist an unlawful warrantless arrest”);
Rodgers v. State, 373 A.2d 944, 947–48 (Md. 1977) (discussing the historical
underpinnings of the common law right to resist an arrest). A person may therefore
offer reasonable resistance to repel an unlawful warrantless arrest. Dennis v. State,
674 A.2d 928, 936 (Md. 1996).
See Arthur v. State, 24 A.3d 667, 677 (Md. 2011) (noting that “because the evidence
presented at trial generated the issue of whether [police] had probable cause to arrest
Arthur . . . the only way for Arthur to have a fair trial is for the jury to understand the
law concerning his right to resist an unlawful arrest”).
See MD. STATE BAR STANDING COMM., MARYLAND CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 3:26 (2d ed. Supp. 2016).
Id. § 3:28.
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“consider all the circumstances surrounding the statement,” including
a list of enumerated circumstances.309 The jury is then left to give the
statement “such weight as [it] believe it deserves,” if it is voluntary,
but told that it “must disregard it,” if it finds that the statement was
not voluntary.310
Thus, although Maryland juries should not be instructed as to
pure factual inferences, Maryland juries are routinely informed of the
underlying legal principles that will influence their factual findings
and instructed to use these legal principles in resolving factual
disputes. The key, therefore, in requesting a jury instruction
concerning law enforcement officers’ failure to comply with the
statutory standards for extrajudicial identification procedures is to tie
the instruction to the law and to let the legal standards established by
law guide the jury in assessing the facts of the case. Under the
statute, law enforcement agencies are required to adopt and employ a
set of standards in conducting eyewitness identification
procedures.311 Unlike the “no duty” situation confronted in Atkins,
Stabb, and Robinson, law enforcement officers are under a legal duty
to adopt and implement these procedures. Moreover, as Cost noted,
“[f]or the judicial system to function fairly, one party in a case cannot
be permitted to gain an unfair advantage through the destruction of
evidence,” and therefore, an instruction concerning the inferences
that arise when a party destroys relevant evidence “help[s] ensure that
the interests of justice are protected.”312 When a law enforcement
agency fails to comply with Maryland law and adopt an eyewitness
identification protocol that complies with the statutory mandate, or
when individual officers fail to comply with such a protocol, the
prosecution has gained an unfair advantage by securing the
identification of the accused in a less-reliable manner than required
by law. In such a situation, the only way to restore the parties to
where they should be is to instruct the jury as to the statutory
requirements and permit the jury to use statutory non-compliance as a
factor in evaluating the relative weight to afford to the identification.
A jury instruction on this topic would therefore inform the jury as
to the statutory requirements and permit the jury to evaluate whether
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id. § 3:18.
Id.
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 3-506.1(b)–(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016).
Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 197 (Md. 2010).
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non-compliance with the statute affects the weight given to the
identification.
The author suggests the following annotated
instruction as a guide:313
You have heard evidence that the defendant was identified
prior to trial from [a lineup] [an array of pictures] shown to
a witness. Maryland law requires a certain set of procedures
to be followed in any procedure in which a witness is asked
to identify a suspect from [a live lineup] [an array of
photographs] including [a photograph of] the suspect.314
You are instructed that:
The officer conducting the procedure may not know the
identity of the suspect or, at minimum, if the officer knows
the identity of the suspect he or she may not know which
lineup member is being viewed by the witness;315
The witness must be instructed, prior to the administration
of the procedure, that the perpetrator may or may not be
among the persons in the procedure;316
The officer administering the procedure must document in
writing all identification statements made by the eyewitness
at the time of the procedure, and prior to any feedback given
to the witness, including a statement in the witness’s own
words describing the witness’s confidence level that the
person identified is the perpetrator of the crime;317
The procedure must include a minimum of [four] [five]318
other individuals who resemble the description of the
perpetrator given by the eyewitness in significant physical
features, including any unique or unusual features;319
The array must contain different “fillers” if the witness has
previously participated in an identification procedure;320

313.

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

This instruction is modeled on the statutory procedure codified in section 3-506.1 of
the Maryland Public Safety Code. An instruction may also be modeled on the
complementary model policy of the Eyewitness Identification Policy. Policy, supra
note 195, at 33.
This communicates the essence of the definition of an “identification procedure” in
section 3-506.1(a)(8) of the Maryland Public Safety Code.
PUB. SAFETY §§ 3-506.1(a)(3)–(4), (b)(1).
Id. § 3-506.1(b)(3).
Id. §§ 3-506.1(a)(9), (b)(4).
Five “fillers” must be used in a photographic array, and four “fillers” must be used
during an in-person lineup procedure. Id. §§ 3-506.1(c)(2)–(3).
Id. § 3-506.1(c)(1).
Id. § 3-506.1(d).
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If identification procedures are conducted for multiple
eyewitnesses, the procedure must be conducted separately
for each witness, the suspect must be placed in a different
position for each procedure, and the witnesses may not
communicate with each other until all procedures have been
completed;321 and
At the end of the procedure, police must document the
procedure via an audio or video recording, or document in
writing all identification and non-identification results
obtained from the procedure; the signed identification
statement of the eyewitness; the names of all persons
present at the procedure; the date and time of the procedure;
whether the witness identified a “filler” other than the
suspect; and retain all photographs used in the procedure.322
Should you find that the law enforcement officers who
administered the identification procedure in this case failed
to comply with any of these requirements, you may consider
the failure to comply with those requirements in assigning
the weight to give to the identification secured by that
procedure.
Like any other jury instruction, this instruction would have to be
factually generated by the evidence at trial.323 This, therefore, shows
the importance of cross-examining the law enforcement officer who
administered the procedure as to what was done, and what was not
done, during the procedure.324 This also shows how expert
testimony, concerning the need for such procedures and how the
failure to employ these procedures may affect the weight of an
identification, can help the jury. This instruction will not be factually
generated or necessary if the evidence shows that the law
enforcement agency and the individual officers who administered the
procedure complied with the statute.
The most important reason of why such an instruction may be
warranted is because absent this instruction, jurors will have no way
of knowing the pertinent Maryland law concerning the creation and
administration of extrajudicial identification procedures.
The
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id. §§ 3-506.1(e)(1)–(3).
Id. § 3-506.1(f).
See Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 189 (Md. 2010); Dickey v. State, 946 A.2d 444, 450
(Md. 2008).
See supra Section II.B.2.
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General Assembly has required these procedures for a reason: to
create an increase in the overall reliability of eyewitness
identifications at trial. When law enforcement agencies or individual
officers fail to abide by these requirements and submit an
identification that was not produced by these more reliable
procedures, a jury should be informed of that statutory violation and
allowed to utilize the failure to comply with the required procedures
in evaluating the weight to afford the resulting identification. The
provision of such an instruction will therefore induce compliance
with the statute and equal the adversarial playing field in the wake of
law enforcement dereliction of their statutory duty to secure
identifications in the manner proscribed by statute.
5. Closing Argument
Perhaps the most modest of the potential remedies that should be
afforded to a defendant who has been identified in a procedure that
does not comply with the statutory protocol is to permit robust
closing argument on law enforcement’s failure to comply with the
statute. While this is a modest remedy—and, perhaps, the most noncontroversial remedy proposed by this article—the need for robust
argument may ultimately highlight the necessity of the other
remedies suggested in this article.
In Maryland, “liberal freedom of speech should be allowed”325 in
closing argument and “attorneys are afforded great leeway in
presenting closing arguments to the jury.”326 In this vein, Maryland
permits the defendant to comment upon the failure to employ a more
sophisticated investigation during closing argument. For example, in
Eley v. State, the trial court did not permit the defendant to note in
closing argument that there was no fingerprint evidence connecting
him to a vehicle used in a crime.327 The Maryland Court of Appeals
reversed the conviction, noting that “the excluded comments went to
the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, or more specifically the
lack of evidence,”328 and also to the weight of the evidence because
“the State had available to it a better method of identificationfingerprint evidence” but “failed to produce any such evidence and
failed to offer any explanation for that failure.”329 Thus, the Court
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Wilhelm v. State, 326 A.2d 707, 714 (Md. 1974).
Degren v. State, 722 A.2d 887, 901 (Md. 1999).
419 A.2d 384, 385 (Md. 1980).
Id. at 386–87.
Id. at 387.
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concluded, “where a better method of identification may be available
and the State offers no explanation whatsoever for its failure to come
forward with such evidence, it is not unreasonable to allow the
defendant to call attention to its failure to do so.”330
In Eley, the Maryland Court of Appeals noted that the defendant
could comment upon the failure to utilize fingerprint evidence even
though there was no duty for law enforcement officers to utilize this
investigative technique.331
Unlike the situation in Eley, law
enforcement officers are under a statutory duty to utilize certain
procedures in administering an extrajudicial identification
procedure.332 If the defendant in the Eley/Sample line of cases may
comment upon the failure to utilize “a better method of
identification” that is “available” to investigators, surely a defendant
identified in an identification procedure that does not comply with the
statutory guidelines—aimed at increasing the reliability of
identifications—should be given similar leeway to comment upon the
State’s failure to utilize a more reliable form of investigation.333
Maryland decisions permit a defendant to focus on weaknesses in
eyewitness identifications in closing argument. In Smith v. State, a
witness identified a person of a different race as the person who tried
to rob her at gunpoint.334 The witness also testified that she was
“extremely good with faces,” “very, very good with people,” and
“stud[ied] faces and . . . look[ed] for features on people that make
them more distinct.”335 Prior to closing argument, the trial judge
informed the parties that “defense counsel will not be able to argue
on cross-racial identification . . . [because] there is not evidence in
this case to that effect.”336 On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals
reviewed the scientific literature concerning cross-racial
330.

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id.; accord Sample v. State, 550 A.2d 661, 663 (Md. 1988) (noting that “when the
State has failed to utilize a well-known, readily available, and superior method of
proof to link the defendant with the criminal activity, the defendant ought to be able
to comment on the absence of such evidence”).
Eley, 419 A.2d at 387 (noting “it is not incumbent upon the State to produce
fingerprint evidence to prove guilt”).
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-506 (LexisNexis 2011).
See Eley, 419 A.2d at 387.
880 A.2d 288, 291 (Md. 2005).
Id. at 292.
Id. (first alteration in original). Additionally, the trial judge again informed the
parties: “So it is perfectly clear, I’m denying your request, but I would permit you to
say that your client is black, victim is white, but I will not let you refer to cross-racial
identification.” Id. at 293.
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identification,337 and ultimately concluded that, within the specific
milieu of a cross-racial identification by a witness who claimed to be
especially adept at identifying individuals, “[d]efense counsel clearly
was entitled to challenge [the] ‘educated’ identification of the
defendants by arguing to the jury that her identification should not be
accorded the weight that she credited to her own ability to identify
them.”338 The Court came to this conclusion, despite acknowledging
that “[a]t this juncture the extent to which own-race bias affects
eyewitness identification is unclear based on the available studies
addressing this issue, so that we cannot state with certainty that
difficulty in cross-racial identification is an established matter of
common knowledge.”339
Nevertheless, because “the victim’s
identification of the defendants was anchored in her enhanced ability
to identify faces . . . defense counsel should have been allowed to
argue the difficulties of cross-racial identification in closing
argument.”340
If defense counsel is allowed to argue a controversial topic, such
as the diminished weight to afford a cross-racial identification
without affirmative evidence of the effect of that phenomena, counsel
should be able to comment upon the failure to comply with the legal
requirements for creating and administering more reliable
extrajudicial identification procedures. There can be no debate that
every law enforcement agency in Maryland must adopt and
implement a series of procedures that make the identification
procedure more reliable. When the evidence shows that law
enforcement officers failed to comply with these requirements—and
certainly if additional evidence, such as expert testimony shows that
this violation of the statute affects the reliability of the
identification—defense counsel should be allowed to comment upon
the statutory violation, and its effect, in closing argument. This
modest defense is predicated on law enforcement’s failure to comply
with the clear statutory guidelines for creating and administering an
extrajudicial identification procedure.

337.

338.
339.
340.

Id. at 294–98. The Court noted that “a cross-racial identification occurs when an
eyewitness of one race is asked to identify a particular individual of another race.”
Id. at 294 (citing John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of CrossRacial Identifications, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 211 (2001)).
Id. at 300.
Id.
Id.
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The necessity of a robust closing argument, focusing upon the
failure to employ the procedures required by statute, highlights the
commensurate need for the other remedies proposed in this article.
For example, any argument must be based on the facts adduced at
trial.341 To have the facts necessary to make this argument counsel
must be allowed to cross-examine the officer or officers who created
and administered the procedure to establish what was, and was not,
done when the procedure was administered.342 More importantly, in
order for the jury to fully grasp the importance of the failure to
employ certain elements of the procedure, expert testimony may be
necessary to show how compliance with the statutorily required
procedures would increase the reliability of the identification and
how the pertinent points of departure from the statutory policy
decrease the reliability of the identification.343
Finally, a jury instruction may be necessary to put the closing
argument in its necessary context. Absent a jury instruction, jurors
will have no way of knowing that certain procedures are required
under Maryland law when law enforcement officers create and
administer an identification procedure. In order to apply the law,
jurors must first know the law. Thus, without instructional guidance,
jurors will not know that these procedures are not simply
recommendations of defense counsel or of a defense expert, but are
required by the General Assembly to increase the reliability of
extrajudicial identifications in Maryland. Maryland law has long
recognized “a statement or instruction by the trial judge carries with
it the imprimatur of a judge learned in the law, and therefore usually
has more force and effect than if merely presented by counsel.”344
Given that such an instruction is triggered only by law enforcement
non-compliance with the statute, an instruction as to the legal
requirements for creating and administering an identification

341.
342.
343.
344.

See, e.g., Wilhelm v. State, 326 A.2d 707, 714 (Md. 1974) (noting that “counsel has
the right to make any comment or argument that is warranted by the evidence proved
or inferences therefrom”).
See supra notes 255–58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 259–71 and accompanying text.
Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 196–97 (Md. 2010) (quoting Hardison v. State, 172 A.2d
407, 411 (Md. 1961)).
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procedure may be necessary to provide the proper weight and context
for defense closing argument.345
Thus, consistent with the traditional leeway provided to counsel
in closing argument, counsel should be able to note in argument that
law enforcement officers failed to comply with statutorily required
protocols for creating and administering an extrajudicial
identification procedure, and that the failure to comply with these
protocols affected the reliability (and resulting evidentiary weight) of
the ensuing identification. Counsel—and courts—should be fully
aware that such an argument must be supported by the evidence in
the case, and thus, counsel should adduce facts showing noncompliance with the statutorily required protocols. Courts should
also be aware that this remedy should not be viewed in isolation, but
should be viewed as the culmination of a series of trial remedies
resulting from law enforcement non-compliance with the statute.
V. CONCLUSION
The truest goal of our criminal justice system should be to ensure
that the guilty are convicted and the innocent remain free. While
neither law nor science will likely ever devise an accurate way to
assay an eyewitness identification for ultimate accuracy, present
science has identified ways in which the creation and administration
of extrajudicial identification procedures may produce more reliable
results. The Maryland General Assembly has required every law
enforcement agency in Maryland to adopt and implement these more
reliable procedures. A reliable process produces reliable results.
Administration of more reliable identification procedures will
ultimately produce identifications that have increased reliability.
Therefore, inducing and encouraging adherence to the statutorily
required procedures should ultimately promote the legislative goal—
hopefully shared by all participants in the criminal justice system—
and secure identifications that more often correctly identify the guilty
and avoid wrongful identification of the innocent.
For nearly four centuries, Marylanders have been known for their
humble middle temperament. This article seeks to move defense
counsel away from viewing total suppression of an identification (on
constitutional grounds) as the only defense tactic to respond to an
345.

See id. at 196 (explaining that “argument by counsel to the jury will naturally be
imbued with a greater gravitas when it is supported by a[n] instruction on the same
point issued from the bench”).
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identification and to utilize the new statutory reforms to seek
intermediate remedies at trial. This approach respects both the
judicial retention of the high standard for constitutional suppression
of an identification and the legislative adoption of certain procedures
that increase the reliability of an extrajudicial identification; like the
voyagers upon the Ark and the Dove, it seeks “a middle temperature
between the two.” This article is written to provide a roadmap as to
how counsel for an individual identified in a non-compliant
procedure may seek remedies at trial—and under existing Maryland
law—in response to law enforcement’s non-compliance with the
statutorily mandated procedure for creating and administering an
extrajudicial identification procedure. The ultimate goal of this
article is that the availability of these remedies will encourage law
enforcement agencies (and officers) to comply with the statute.
Indeed, the author’s sincere hope is that these remedies will never be
needed because law enforcement has acted in full fidelity to the
statute. Should these remedies ever be needed at trial, it is an even
greater goal of the author that they will assist a jury in convicting a
guilty person or appropriately allowing an innocent person to remain
free.
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